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ABSTRACT 
 
VENUE RESOLUTION AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS: 
FOUR MODELS OF JURISDICTIONAL PROPRIETY by 
Professor Alan Reed 
 
Venue resolution is of fundamental importance in the arena of international 
commercial litigation.  A panoply of factors are engaged when a cross-border tort 
occurs or transnational contract is breached.  Dyspeptic litigants are presented 
with a disputed ‘border skirmish’ on appropriate litigational battleground.  
Dilemmatic choices apply to identification of which country to commence 
proceedings across respective fora.  It is  submitted that in this context an 
important role for forum non conveniens needs to be  fashioned, and the doctrine 
may operate as a species of alternative dispute resolution.  The discretionary and 
flexible nature of forum non conveniens may operate to temper exorbitant  
jurisdiction principle prevalent in  Anglo-American law.  The putative search for a 
true seat and natural forum for venue resolution promotes  systemic natural 
justice.   
 
There is necessarily a residual place for forum non conveniens, as a fail-safe 
device, where actions are egregiously brought against a home defendant simply to 
vex and harass her-actions where it is unduly inconvenient to allow them to 
proceed in the seised forum.  The syntax of this supererogatory model of  forum 
non conveniens arguably heralds a need to return to the old abuse of process 
standard-bearer as the apposite reformulated test.  There is a need to refocus the 
forum non conveniens inquiry to more closely appropriate the original intent and 
social conscience of the doctrine.  The doctrine is consequently deconstructed in 
light of paradigms presented by four models: English traditional law principles; 
Brussels I Regulation and actor sequitur forum rei adoption of 
communitarianism/harmonisation and the lack of review; U.S. ideology post-
Bhopal; and the template presented by recent Australian reforms.  It is propounded 
that the discriminatory nature of the federal standard adopted in Piper Aircraft has 
capriciously insulated behemoth U.S. multinationals from liability for conduct 
abroad.  Machiavellian games have been played with stalking horse arguments of 
international comity and anti-chauvinism. 
 
Key precedential authorities in respective fora are critiqued, notably, Connelly, 
Owusu, Piper, Voth and Lubbe.  Public and private evaluative orderings are 
examined as part of the  presentation and consequential impact of a gallimaufry of 
exogenetic influences: (i) applicable law and intellectual coherence; (ii) Fiscus 
conveniens and court delays; (iii) evidential and procedural issues and (iv).  
Minimum standards of justice abroad.  It is identified that a reformulation is 
required to enhance consideration of applicable law public policy implications as 
part of sybaritic intellectual coherence of substantive law.  The article presents an 
innovative evaluation of the new European framework for choice of law in 
contract and tort presented by recent adoption of the Rome I and II Regulations.  
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They are deconstructed, however, in terms of connectivity with public interest and 
progenitor of harm precepts relevant to venue resolution and de novo illustrations 
are adduced.  The conclusions suggest a transmogrification away from a most 
significant forum approach towards a via media perspective expressing a clear 
inappropriate forum threshold reflecting the venerable antiquity and sophistication 
of the doctrine.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“A brisk preliminary skirmish on jurisdiction may well allow each 
side to gauge the strength of the other’s case and the stomach each 
has for the fight.  After the issue has been decided, the case may 
well settle and, if it does, settle on better informed terms than 
would otherwise have been the case.  If this is so, the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens  also justifies itself as a species of 
alternative dispute resolution”1 
 
Forum non conveniens is an important doctrine that allows the court a 
discretion to decline jurisdiction in cases connected to an alternative legal system 
that presents a more ‘natural’ forum for venue resolution.2  The discretionary 
nature of the articulated theory  allows presumptive choice, where applicable, to  
resolution of a forum.3  It is impossible to overstate the significance of the 
formulation in terms of international commercial litigation, and the impact 
effected on dispute resolution.4  It has been cogently stated that, “the battle over 
where the litigation occurs is typically the hardest fought and most important issue 
in a transnational case.”5  The parties are litigating in order to determine where to 
litigate.6  In such terms the debate is not focused on establishment of jurisdiction, 
but rather whether it should be exercised and whether a foreign court represents, 
“a more appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating the controversy.”7  In 
                                                          
1
  ADRIAN BRIGGS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 95 (2002). 
2
  See generally J. Stanton-Hill, “Towards Global Convenience, Fairness, and Judicial Economy: 
An Argument in Support of Conditional Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals Before 
Determining Jurisdiction in United States Federal District Courts” (2008) 41 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 1177; and Michael McParland, “Forum Non Conveniens in the 
U.S: Are the Courtroom Doors Finally Shut?” (2008) Journal of Personal Injury Law 58.  
3
  See generally, Laurel E Miller, “Forum Non Conveniens and State Control of Foreign Plaintiff 
Access to U.S. Courts in International  Tort Actions” (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law 
Review 1369; Ronald A Brand, “Comparative Forum Non Conveniens and the Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments” (2002) 37 Texas International Law Journal 467; 
Freidrich K. Juenger, “Forum Shopping, Domestic and International” (1989) 63 Tulane Law 
Review 553; and Joel H. Samuels, “When is an Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the  
Forum Non Conveniens Analysis (2010) 85 Indiana Law Journal 1059. 
4
  As Park has stated in evocative language, “[L]itigation may take place before courts of 
questionable independence, with procedural traditions radically different from those to which 
the litigant is accustomed.  Proceedings may unfold not in a variant of the language of  
Shakespeare, but in the tongues of Molière, Cervantes, Demosthenes or Mohammed”; 
WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 8-9 (1995). 
5
  David W. Robertson and Paula K. Speck, “Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal 
Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions” (1990) 68 Texas Law Review 
937, at 938. 
6
  RICHARD FENTIMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, 486 (2010). 
7
  Sinochem Int’l Co. v Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1188 (2007). 
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this regard there are particularistic attractions for the suit being brought by a 
plaintiff in the U.S. within their adventitious legal framework, “As a moth is 
drawn  to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States.”8  Although litigants 
may have quite natural proclivities for suit therein the likely outcome, specifically 
if they are foreign plaintiffs bringing suit against a U.S. multinational, is 
disappointment.9  An unfortunate situation prevails, highlighted throughout this 
article, that behemoth U.S. corporations enjoy inequitable benefit in the 
litigational battleground presented by a federal standard jurisprudential bulwark: 
 
“Corporations have the dual advantage of profiting  from their 
investments in areas where local citizens are likely to be effectively 
excluded from the host country’s legal and political systems, while 
also remaining insulated from actions in home country courts.”10 
 
At a practical and theoretical level forum non conveniens doctrine is often 
supererogatory  in international commercial disputes.11  The discretionary nature 
of doctrinal principles adduced plays a vital role in tempering aspects of 
exorbitant jurisdictional principles that apply  in Anglo-American extant law.12  
The template provided allows for a sophisticated evaluation of ‘appropriate’ 
                                                          
8
  See Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. V Bloch [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, at 733-4 per Lord 
Denning; and see generally, Weintraub, “International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens” 
(1994) 29 Texas International Law Journal 321. 
9
  See Erin Foley Smith, “Right to Remedies and the Inconvenience of Forum Non Conveniens: 
Opening U.S. Courts to Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuses” (2010) 44 Columbia 
Journal of Law and Social Problems 145; Finity E Jernagan, “Forum Non Conveniens: Whose 
Convenience and Justice?” (2008) 86  Texas Law Review 1079; and Emil Petrossian, “In 
Pursuit of the Perfect Forum: Transnational Forum Shopping in the United States and 
England” (2007) 40 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1257. 
10
  Foley Smith, supra n. 9, at 159; and see further, Malcolm J Rogge, “Towards Transnational 
Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non 
Conveniens in In Re: Union Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua and Aguinda” (2001) 36 Texas 
International Law Journal 299. 
11
  See, generally, Michael M Karayanni, “The Myth and Reality of a Controversy: Public Factors 
and the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine” (2000) 21 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
327, at 333 who asserts: “ [I]n common law countries, where it was accepted that jurisdiction 
could be dependent on connections that were not always of a meaningful nature, a need 
emerged within  jurisdictional thoughts to introduce a second stage into the jurisdictional 
inquiry.  The second stage was supposed to guarantee the existence of a meaningful 
connection with the case and  thereby make adjudication in the local forum more reasonable”; 
and, see, generally, Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman and Keith A Rowley, “Forum Non Conveniens 
in Federal Statutory Cases” (200) 49 Emory L.J. 1137; and Ellen L. Hayes, “Forum Non 
Conveniens in England, Australia and Japan.  The Allocation of Jurisdiction in Transnational 
Litigation” (1992) 26 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 41. 
12
 See, generally, Jeffrey E Baldwin, “International Human Rights Plaintiffs and the Doctrine of 
Forum Non Conveniens” (2007) 40 Cornell International  Law Journal 749; and, Christopher 
A. Whytock, “The Evolving Forum Shopping System” (2011) 96 Cornell Law Review 481. 
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jurisdiction beyond the blunt instrument of adjudicatory connection to a forum.  
The appraisal conducted within the balanced equation is approached by trial courts 
in a neutral and objective fashion, and dismissal of suits via this mechanism, 
where litigation is brought simply to ‘vex or harass’ a dyspeptic party provides an 
important tactical weapon against  pejorative reverse forum shopping and 
regrettable venue engagement.13  There is a systemic promotion of  procedural 
justice in this regard with the  putative search for the ‘natural’ venue to  resolve a 
contract  or tort dispute.  An efficiency  may arise in terms of outcome 
determination as resolution of the venue often promotes a  compromise settlement  
or negotiations, avoiding  trials and lengthy engagement centred around 
contestation of the substantive merits.14  
Forum non conveniens  may promote efficiency, reduced cost and promote 
convenience, as adduced, by avoiding trial procedure and by identification of the 
‘best’ place to litigate in terms of adjectival evidence and focal epicentre of  the 
dispute.15  The presumption is that the most appropriate forum standardisation 
enhances fairness and efficiency by localisation of the dispute within the purview 
of the natural forum.  It is often the ultimate litigation introspection as the party 
who  loses the venue battle retreats and forecloses to avoid the risk of litigation in 
an unwelcome alternative forum.16  The discretionary element purveyed within the 
framework allows for  resolution of hard cases in a contemporary  and nuanced 
                                                          
13
  See Robertson, “Conflict of Laws and Forum Non Conveniens Determinations in Maritime 
Personal Injury and Death Cases in United States Courts”, in New Directions in Maritime Law 
51 at 51-2 (Sharpe and Spicer eds. 1985).  Robertson states: “Just as plaintiffs and their 
lawyers seek the best forum and the best law by bringing suit in the United States and seeking 
recovery under American law, so do defendants and their lawyers seek the best forum and the 
best law by resisting American jurisdiction and the application of American law, by seeking 
dismissal of the United States action on the basis of the discretionary doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, and occasionally by moving a tribunal outside the United States to enjoin plaintiff 
from litigating in the chosen forum”;  ibid., at 52; and see, also, Albright, “In Personam 
Jurisdiction: A Confused and Inappropriate Substitute for Forum Non Conveniens” (1992) 71 
Tex. L. Rev. 351; Reynolds, “The Proper Forum for a Suit: Transnational Forum Non 
Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts “ (1992) 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1663; 
and Duval-Major, “One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens 
and the International Plaintiffs (1992) 77 Cornell L.R. 650. 
14
  Fentiman, supra n. 6., at 480-484; and, see, generally, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, 
AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008); GARY B. BORN AND PETER 
B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 
(2007); and JONATHAN HILL AND ADELINE CHONG, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, (Hart Publishing, 4th edn.), (2010).  
15
  Fentiman, supra. n.6., at 482-484. 
16
  Ibid., and see, generally, C.M.V. CLARKSON AND JONATHAN HILL, THE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS,  (Oxford Press, 4th edn), (2011); and DAVID McCLEAN AND KISCH 
BEEVERS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, (Sweet and Maxwell, 7th edn.), (2009). 
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fashion, and this prompted Lord Goff to assert that forum non conveniens, “can be 
regarded as one of the most civilised of legal principles.”17  Others, of course, are 
more hostile and vituperative in their treatment of the analysis.18 
This article seeks to deconstruct four alternative models of venue 
resolution and the synergous relationship with  forum non conveniens.  Anglo-
American traditional common law principles are examined in the context of 
Spiliada Maritime19 and the federal standard articulated in Gulf Oil20/Piper 
Aircraft21 which both set out a two-prong test for amenability determination.  The 
search is for the most appropriate forum with clear discretion vested in the trial 
judge to reflect upon a gallimaufry of exogenetic  factors in evaluation of the 
availability of another ‘amenable’ forum, most suitable in terms of convenience 
and the ends of justice.22  In addressing the range of  impacted public and private 
interest concerns it is suggested that a rebalance is needed in terms of the 
intellectual coherence of substantive approach.  Public policy interests of the 
potentially engaged fora need to be promoted in terms of the sybaritic relationship 
that should exist with applicable choice of law concerns.23  Choice of law should 
be subject to  enhanced consideration as part of the venue resolution equation, and 
in this regard parallels are drawn to the nature of ‘interests’ within U.S. 
governmental interest analysis techniques,24 and new Europeanisation of choice of 
                                                          
17
  Airbus Indus. G.I.E. v Patel [1999] 1 A.C 119, 141 (H.L. 1998) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
18
  See, generally, Hal S. Scott, “What to do about Foreign Discriminatory Forum Non 
Conveniens Legislation” (2009) 49 Harvard ILJ 95; and Jennifer L. Woulfe, “Where Forum 
Non Conveniens and Pre-emptive Jurisdiction Collide: An Analytical Look at Latin-American 
Pre-emptive Jurisdiction Laws in the United States” (2010) 30 Saint Louis University Public 
Law Review 171.  See Stewart. “Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine In Search of a Role” 
(1986) 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1259, at 1262-4 (arguing that the policies addressed by forum non 
conveniens are best considered in the jurisdictional contexts and there is no valid continuing 
role for forum non conveniens, only a repetitive one). 
19
  Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex, Ltd. [1987] A.C. 460. 
20
  Gulf Oil Corp. v Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).  
21
  Piper Aircraft v Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
22
  See, generally, Karayanni, supra. n. 11. 
23
  See, generally, Spencer, “Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis” (2006) 73 
University of Chicago L.R. 617; Litman, “Considerations Of Choice of Law in the Doctrine of  
Forum Non Conveniens” (1986) 74 California L.R. 565; Jernagan, supra n. 9; and, Anthony 
Gray, “Forum Non Conveniens in Australia: A Comparative Analysis” (2009) 38 Common 
Law World Review 207. 
24
  Spencer, supra n. 23, at 659 asserts: “For a state to be able to dictate, through its laws, the 
substantive outcome of a suit suggests that the state has an interest in the matter sufficient to 
permit its laws to govern rather than those of another state.  On what basis then can a 
jurisdictional doctrine dictate that this same state is not empowered  to adjudicate the very 
dispute to which its law applies?” and see, also, Adrian Briggs, “In Praise and Defence of 
Renvoi” (1998) 47 International  and Comparative Law Quarterly 877, at 878 contending: 
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law in the Rome I and II Regulations.25  A new way forward is adduced to 
beneficially promulgate overlapping critique of private international law 
principles.   
Anglo-American traditional principles on most appropriate forum are 
contrasted with the deontological bright-line mechanistic tests applied to 
jurisdiction and venue resolution for  civil and commercial matters throughout 
European Contracting States in the Brussels I Regulation.26  What is presented is 
an internal regulatory  framework that is anathema to flexible and discretionary  
forum non conveniens, but adopts certainty, party expectations and fixed 
presumptions as a mandate for convenience and ease of exposition.27  The lack of 
flexibility has produced, on occasion, certain outcomes which  could have been 
legitimately avoided by means of a more nuanced and appropriate response 
                                                                                                                                                               
“even today we still look at choice of law and on jurisdiction as if each was self-contained and 
neither was coloured by the other, ‘choice of law [is] a stepping stone to determining 
jurisdiction, not the other way around”; ibid., at 883. 
25
  See Clay H. Kaminsky, “The Rome II Regulation: A Comparative Perspective on Federalizing 
Choice of Law” (2010) 85 Tulane Law Review 55; M. Chapman, “The Rome II Regulation 
and a European Law Enforcement Area: Harmony and Discord in the Assessment of 
Damages” (2010) Journal  of Personal Injury Law 1; Symeon C. Symeonides, Rome II and 
Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity” (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 177; 
Trevor  C. Hartley, “Choice of Law for Non-Contractual Liability: Selected Problems Under 
the Rome II Regulation” (2008) International and Comparative Law Quarterly; Alan Reed, 
“The Rome I Regulation and Reapprochement of Anglo-American Choice of Law in Contract: 
A Heralded Triumph of Pragmatism  Over Theory” (2012) 23 Florida Journal of  International 
Law 357; and ANDREW DICKINSON, THE ROME II REGULATION: THE LAW 
APPLICABLE TO NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLGATIONS, (Oxford University Press), 
(2008). 
26
  See European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial  Matters, Brussels, Sept. 27, 1968, 1968 J.O. ((27) 1, updated Jan. 26, 1998 
(consolidated and updated version of the 1968 Convention and  the Protocol of 1971, 
following the 1996 Accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of  Finland and the 
Kingdom of Sweden) [hereinafter Brussels Convention].  On May 1, 1999, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts became effective for the European Union Member 
States, and competence for co-ordination of internal rules on jurisdiction and recognition of 
judgments now lies with the Community institutions.  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the 
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain 
related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].  A further 
step in the promulgation of the European schematic template was the substitution of the 
Brussels Convention by the Brussels I Regulation, which became effective on 1 March 2002; 
Regulation (E.C.) No. 44/2001, OJ 2001 L.12/1.  See, generally, Clarkson and Hill, supra n. 
16., at 59-102. 
27
  The wide ‘appropriate forum’ discretion does not apply to the Brussels I Regulation.  It was 
anathema to all but two of the Contracting States (the United Kingdom and Ireland: ‘the idea 
that a national court has discretion in the exercise of jurisdiction either territorially or as 
regards the subject-matter of a dispute does not generally exist in Continental legal systems’; 
see the Schlosser Report (1979) OJ C59/71, at 97. 
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addressing concerns of genuine connectivity of a forum to a dispute.28  The fourth 
element that is extirpated in this particular rationale is  the distinctive approach 
laid down by the High Court of Australia in Voth.29  This arguably presents an 
encomium solution to international  commercial litigation, by presenting an abuse 
of process standardisation whereby proceedings will only be stayed in the lex fori 
on a clearly inappropriate forum standardisation.30 
The discussions that follow are set out in a discrete and bespoke fashion.  
In section 2 there is consideration of the English common law developments in 
forum non conveniens that led to extant law set out by the House of Lords in 
Spiliada.31  This position is directly contrasted in section 3 that focuses on the 
Brussels  I Regulation and the rigidity presented by the general rule of actor 
sequitur forum rei,32 and compartmentalised civil procedure harmonisation 
provisions.  The rejection of forum non conveniens in the significant Court of 
Justice decision in Owusu v Jackson33 is evaluated, and a number of potentially 
                                                          
28
  See Owusu v Jackson and others (Case – 281/02) [2005] 2 W.L.R. 942; [2005] Q.B. 801, ECJ 
Erich Gasser GmhH v MISAT Srl. (Case C – 116/02) [2005] Q.B.1; and Turner v Grovit 
(Case C – 159/02) [2005] 1 A.C. 101. 
29
  (1990) 171 CLR 538.  The majority judgment was that of Mason C.J., Deane, Dawson and 
Gaudron JJ.  See, generally, Anthony Gray, “Forum Non Conveniens in Australia: A 
Comparative Analysis” (2009) 38 Common Law World Review 207. 
30
  See Richard Garnett, “Stay of Proceedings in Australia: A Clearly Inappropriate Test” (1999) 
23 Melbourne University Law Review 30; Reid Mortenson, “Duty Free Forum Shopping: 
Disputing Venue in the Pacific” (2001) 32 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 
673; MARY KEYES, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL  LITIGATION (Federation 
Press: Sydney, 2005);  and Peter Prince, “Bhopal, Bougainville and Tedi: Why Australia’s 
Forum Non Conveniens Approach is Better” (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 573.  
31
  Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex, Ltd. [1987] A.C. 460. 
32
  The general rule of actor sequitur forum rei draws its rationale from the presupposition that 
the defendant, as the party being pursued by the claimant, should be able to fight on ‘home 
ground’ where she can most easily conduct her defence; see Lando, “The Task of the Court of 
Justice and the System of the Brussels Convention” in Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (ed.), CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE (Butterworths, 
1992) at 26-27.  See, generally, PETER STONE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 129 (I.H. 
Dennis et al eds., 1995): “[T]he rationale for this preference for  defendants over plaintiffs, a 
preference which has deep historical roots, goes beyond mere convenience in the conduct of 
litigation.  Rather, it is linked with such general rules as that which places on the plaintiff the 
burden of proving his claim, and reflects a primordial legal assumption that complaints are 
presumptively unjustified, and that it is better, where the truth cannot be ascertained with 
reasonable certainty, that the Courts should not intervene; that failure to rectify injustice is 
more tolerable than positive action imposing it.  In the present context, this gives rise to a 
general rule that the plaintiff must establish his case to the satisfaction of the court in whose 
goodwill towards him the defendant would presumably have most confidence.” 
33
  Owusu, supra n. 28. 
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harmful consequences for U.S. corporations and individuals trading in Europe are 
identified in terms of potentially inappropriate venue resolution.34 
The article shifts in section 4 to address the federal standard adopted in 
Piper Aircraft35 to forum non conveniens.  An egregious position has been reached 
whereby discriminatory treatment applies unduly against alien plaintiffs.  The 
consequences of this Dantean descent has been to unduly insulate U.S. 
multinationals from liability for harm abroad, but where key decisions are  taken                                  
at home.36  There is a vital policy interest at stake in not allowing U.S. 
multinationals to escape responsibility via Machiavellian venue resolution 
manipulation, “defendants who argue that it would be inconvenient for them to 
litigate in a court located only blocks away from their headquarters often 
encounter sceptical reactions: It is, as Alice said, ‘curioser and curioser’.37  As 
Boyd has cogently stated, “[T]he doctrine appears to be not a convenience 
doctrine at all, but rather an outcome determination which could mask more 
nefarious motives such as xenophobia, a desire to protect multinational 
corporations for injuries in foreign countries, or fears of dealing with different 
issues of foreign law.”38  The key decisions in terms of reverse forum shopping 
are extirpated and then set in context of the real issues deployed when arguments 
are presented in terms of international comity and anti-chauvinism.39 
Section 5 of the article moves the debate into the sphere of Anglo-
American balancing factors that trial courts evaluate as guidance in venue 
resolution.40  A gallimaufry of ethereal and uncertain specific interest factors have 
                                                          
34
  See infra at p. XX. 
35
  Piper Aircraft v Reyno 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
36
  See Samuels supra n. 3; Foley-Smith, supra n. 9; and Jernagan, supra n. 9. 
37
  See Lony v E.I. Dup Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F. 2d 605, 608 (3rd Cir. 1991), noting that 
Du Pont, which is headquartered in Wilmington, Delaware, and is the largest employer in that 
state seeks to move the  action against it to a forum more than  3,000 miles away; and see, 
generally, Born and Rutledge, supra n. 14.  
38
  See Kathryn Lee Boyd, “The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens in 
U.S. Human Rights Litigation, (1998) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 41, 46. 
39
  See infra at p. XX,  See generally, John Fellas “Strategy in International Litigation” (2008) 14 
5 LJAJ. Intl. 8 Comp. L. 317, 231 (asserting that it is a matter of basic common sense that a 
plaintiff will aim to select the most favourable forum, forum shopping does not deserve 
negative treatment. 
40
  See Karayanni, supra n. 11, Petrossian, supra n. 9; and see, generally, Elizabeth T. Lear, 
“National Interests, Foreign Injuries and Federal Forum Non Conveniens” (2007) 41.  U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 559; E.E. Daschbach, “Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way: The Cause for a 
Cure and Remedial Prescriptions for Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in Latin American 
Plaintiff’s Actions against U.S. Multinationals” (2007) 13.  L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 11; and J. 
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been employed in an ad hoc, solipsistic, and intuitive fashion by trial judges as 
empress of the process, consequently allowing a defendant to obtain a stay of 
proceedings.  The evaluation is broken down into four distinct influences: (i) 
applicable law and intellectual coherence; (ii) fiscus conveniens and court delays; 
(iii) evidential and procedural issues; and (iv) minimum standards of justice 
abroad.  An important restructuring is propounded to refocus on connectivity 
between venue selection and coalescence with applicable choice of law as a public 
interest factor.41  It is suggested that one should not be blinkered to a rule-
selectivity only considering the place where injury occurred, but address more 
fundamentally a ‘progenitor of harm’ perspective, addressing evaluation of where 
causally the harm-inducing conduct transpired or elements of contractual breach 
were set in motion.42  Connectivity needs to be addressed in terms of 
identification of the ‘natural’ overall forum with enhanced public interest 
considerations of the impacted forum state.  Intellectual coherence requires 
segregation of applicable law to facilitate appropriate factorisation of relevant 
social factors engaged.43  This sophisticated joinder with forum non conveniens 
principles allows mutual engagement of ‘interests’, ‘policies’ and depécage of 
issues, and should facilitate coalescence of joint public interests.44 
The new intellectual framework is examined in section 5 in light of the 
new European landscape, and reformation in applicable tort and contract choice of 
law issues provided by adoption of the Rome I and II Regulations.  The enquiry is 
extended to embrace the wide-ranging factors that have guided in an unmediated 
sense Anglo-American venue resolution.  Detailed consideration is provided of 
the disparate impact of impecuniosity and cost factors, a potpourri of  private 
interest factors and influences of modern technological developments to 
presentation of physical evidence, the stalking horse lip-service paid to ineffectual 
                                                                                                                                                               
Fawcett, “Trial in England or Abroad: The Underlying Policy Considerations” (1989) 9 
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 205. 
41
  See, generally, Jonathan Harris, “Choice of Law in Tort – Blending in with the Landscape of 
the Conflict of Laws” (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 33; Russell Weintraub, “An Approach 
to Choice of Law that Focuses on Consequences” (1993) 56 Alberta Law Review 701; Adrian 
Briggs, “In Praise and Defence of Renvoi” (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 877; and Lonny Hoffmann and Keith Rowley, supra n. 11. 
42
  See, generally, Jernagan, supra n. 9; and Gray, supra n. 29. 
43
  See, generally, Harry Litman, supra n. 23.  
44
  See, generally, Luther McDougall III, “Judicial Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest 
Analysis” (1982) 35 Vanderbilt Law Review 1; Spencer Waller,  “A Unified Theory of 
Transnational Procedure” (1993) 26 Cornell International Law Journal 101. 
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docket congestion arguments, and true import of advanced arguments on 
consolidation of related proceedings, substantive merits evaluation, trial court 
delays, and ultimate enforceability of final judgements.45  The coverage shifts 
from convenience to ends of justice consideration in terms of the requirement that 
a court’s exercise of adjudicatory discretion does not mandate a denial of justice.  
Amenability is deciphered in terms of whether an alternative forum is practically 
and realistically available to a litigant.46  This raises the spectre of concerns 
addressing effectiveness of remedy, political or social persecution abroad, 
systemic corruption or bias in the foreign legal system and lack of a  stable 
alternative forum to resolve the dispute.47  The forum non conveniens doctrine has 
been judicially created and judicial muscularity applied in Anglo-American law to 
craft individual justice in individual cases, and to apply flexible and elegantly 
crafted solutions.  The implicated consequence of this discretion has, on 
occasions, proved to be implicated uncertainty, unfortunate delay, and enhanced 
costs.48   
An alternative template for forum non conveniens is presented in section 6, 
examining the Australian High Court approach set out in Oceanic Sun49 and 
developed in Voth.50  It is debated whether this provides an optimal solution, as 
the fourth model critiqued, between the inherent flexibility and discretion 
embedded within the Anglo-American variations of most suitable forum  and the 
deontological and mechanical ritualism of the Brussels I Regulation in presenting 
an internal European regulatory framework hostile to the concept of forum non 
conveniens.  The Australian perspective adopts a via media between the Scylla of 
                                                          
45
  Karayanni, supra n. 11, at 376 proposes a more simplified evaluative standardisation: “The 
proper categorization of factors relevant for the forum non conveniens doctrine lies in spheres 
much simpler than those suggested by the public-private dichotomy.  These spheres relate to 
dominant considerations that seem to surface each time a court tries to pinpoint the proper 
forum for litigation.  In this respect, three different categories can be identified: (a) factors 
relating to geographic convenience; (b) factors relating to litigation efficiency; and (c) factors 
relating to substantive justice”; and see, also, Jeffrey A-Van Detta, “Justice Restored: Using a 
Preservation-of-Court-Access Approach to Replace Forum Non Conveniens in Five 
International Product – Injury Case Studies” (2003) 24 Northwestern Journal of International 
Law and Business 53. 
46
  See Samuels, supra n. 3, at 1081-82. 
47
  See Clarkson and Hill, supra n. 16, at 129-130; and McClean and Beevers, supra n. 16, at 
133-134. 
48
  See, generally, Fentiman, supra, n. 6; and Hill and Chong, supra n. 14. 
49
  Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co., Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197. 
50
  See Voth, supra n. 29; and see, generally, Gray, supra n. 29; Prince, supra n. 30; and Garnett, 
supra n. 30. 
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intuitiveness and the Charybdis of rigid inflexibility to ‘natural’ forum and 
imbued connectivity.  The more restrictive Australian ‘abuse of process’ standard 
allows limited flexibility, but rejects dismissal unless the plaintiff’s forum choice 
was plainly intended to ‘vex or harass’ the defendant.51  It represents now a 
distinctive reformulation that adopts the venerable antiquity of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine with resonances of the traditional  St. Pierre52 test.  It stands 
in contrast to Anglo-American courts’ shift to a broader standard leading to 
dismissal whenever forum embracement in another country is considered more 
appropriate for whatever reason.  It also stands in juxtaposition to the Brussels I 
Regulation internal regulatory scheme and lack of genuine discretion. 
A feature of the Australian standard is avoidance of paternalistic comity 
arguments in that, “it does not require the Australian court to judge the quality or 
capability of a foreign legal system:”53 “[T]he willingness of Australian courts to 
stay proceedings brought before them on the grounds of forum non conveniens is 
the litmus test of the country’s attitude towards the ‘superiority’ of its own courts 
and legal system, the respect of the courts and legal systems of other countries and 
the principle of international comity.”54  This ‘superiority’ is applied to evaluation 
of key U.S. jurisprudential precepts involving U.S. multinational corporations and 
abuses of dominant position, and it is highlighted that more efficacious solutions 
can be effected by revivification of an abuse of process template. 
Forum non conveniens considerations play a vital rôle in international 
commercial litigation.55  Judicial economy and civil recovery processes are 
benefited by locating disputes within the venue of their natural forum.  
Expedition, party convenience and discretionary flexibility are all adventitious 
policy goals in any international litigation structure, and are promoted by the 
sophistication of the doctrine.  The overt costs may prove to be lack of certainty 
and additional litigation brought about by the international chess battle on 
                                                          
51
  The joint majority judgments provided in Voth by Mason C.J., Deane, Dawson and Gaudron 
J.J. asserted that the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ standardisation they advanced, ‘focuses on 
the advantages and disadvantages arising from a continuation of the proceedings in the 
selected forum rather than on the need to make a comparative judgment between the two 
forums”; see Voth, supra n. 29, at 558. 
52
  St Pierre v South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd [1936] 1 K.B. 382; see infra below at 
p. XX. 
53
  See Jernagan, supra n. 9, at 1114. 
54
  Michael Garner, “Towards an Australian Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens” (1989) 38 
International  and Comparative Law Quarterly 361, 361. 
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determinative forum.  Certainty and meeting party expectations constitute the 
essence of the Brussels I Regulation dichotomy to traditional common law.  These 
benefits may be overridden by the approach to lis alibi pendens that enervates a 
race to the courthouse door with potentially an inappropriate forum seised of the 
dispute, allied to unfortunate hostility to forum non conveniens demonstrated by 
the Court of Justice in Owusu, and unfortunate consequential impact for U.S. 
litigants in Europe that are still to be fully determined.56  The via media 
optimisation adopted in Australia presents the way forward for balancing policy 
goals, allied with a sybaritic enhancement of applicable law considerations at the 
venue resolution stage to effect a more intellectually coherent recategorisation.  
 
 
II ENGLISH STANDARDISATIONS AND THE SPILIADA TEST 
A. The Development of English Law 
 
English law reacted slowly in shifting towards a more liberal and 
discretionary template to stay proceedings.57  The ratiocination is that adjudicatory 
jurisdiction exists, but the issue is whether it should be exercised: ‘the existence of 
jurisdiction is one matter, the exercise of the jurisdiction is another.’58  It is  only 
over the course of the last three decades  that forum non conveniens has developed 
to decline jurisdiction in favour of a foreign court which it views as a more 
appropriate forum for the determination of the dispute.59  The evolution has 
                                                                                                                                                               
55
  See, generally, Born and Rutledge, supra n. 14; and Hill and Chong, supra . 14. 
56
  See, generally, Ronald A. Brand, “Comparative Forum Non Conveniens and the Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments” (2002) 37 Texas International Law Journal 467; 
note the impact of the lis pendens provisions set out in Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation: 
“1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of  action and between the same parties are 
brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first seised 
shall  of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first 
seised is established.  2.  Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any 
court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.” 
57
  See, generally, Fentiman, supra n. 6., at 479-488; and Hill and Chong, supra n. 14, at  294-
301. 
58
  Tehrani v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Scotland) [2006] UKHL 47, before 
Lords Nicholls, Hope, Scott, Rodger and Carswell. 
59
  The conceptual template, albeit not the application, can be traced back to the late 19th century, 
and early 20th century; see Société Generale de Paris v Dreyfus Brothers (1885) 29 Ch. D. 
239; and Rosler v Hilbery [1925] Ch. 250. 
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proved much slower than adoption in U.S. federal law.60  There are two 
fundamental and co-related issues engaged.  If service of process occurs on a 
defendant who is present within the jurisdiction, then the defendant can apply for 
a stay or proceedings on the basis that a more appropriate alternative venue exists.  
The other side of the coin is that where exorbitant jurisdiction is sought under 
procedural  rules contained in  CPR 6.36, and service of  process on an absent 
defendant abroad, this leave will be rejected unless the court is persuaded that the 
lex fori is conveniens.61  In each situation the parties are litigating to determine 
where to litigate,62 with imbued cost implications, and naturally the greater 
flexibility engrained in the adduced test then presumptively litigants will believe a 
venue challenge is more worthwhile.63 
In accordance with traditional principles, discretionary leave to challenge 
service abroad matured at an early developmental stage, but similar concepts were 
denied where English adjudicatory jurisdiction was invoked as of right.64  It would 
be a rare and wholly exceptional case where a litigant would be disallowed from 
pursuing an action in England.65  A classic statement of initial common law, 
summarising the developments over the course of a previous generation, was 
provided by Lord Justice Scott in an important statement of principle that 
embodied English law until 1974: 
 
“The true rule…..may I think be stated thus: (1) A mere 
balance of inconvenience is not a sufficient ground for 
depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action 
in an English court if it is otherwise properly brought.  The 
right of access to the King’s Court must not be lightly refused.  
                                                          
60
  See Paxton Blair, “ The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law” (1929) 
29 Columbia Law Review 1. 
61
  See Hill and Chong, supra n. 14, at 295. 
62
  See, for example, Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] A.C. 460, at 464 per Lord 
Templeman. 
63
  See, generally, A.G. Slater, “Forum Non Conveniens: A View from the Shop Floor” (1988) 
104 Law Quarterly Review 554; J.D. McClean, “Foreign Collisions and Forum Conveniens” 
(1973) 22 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 748; A. Barma and D. Elvin, “Forum 
Non Conveniens: Where Do We Go From Here?” (1985) 101 Law Quarterly Review; J.J. 
Fawcett, “Lis Alibi Pendens and the Discretion to Stay” (1984) 47 Modern Law Review 481; 
and M Pryles, “The Basis of Adjudicatory Competence in Private International Law” (1973) 
21 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 61. 
64
  The traditional jurisdiction principles in English common law are predicated on three 
touchstones: (1) presence of a defendant within the jurisdiction; (2) submission; and (3) 
jurisdiction based upon service of process abroad within CPR 6.36, Rules of the Supreme 
Court; and, see, generally, Hill and Chong, supra n. 14, at 294-295. 
65
  Ibid., at 293. 
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(2)  In order to satisfy a stay two conditions must be satisfied, 
one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must 
satisfy the Court that the continuance of the action would work 
an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him 
or would be an abuse of the process of the court in some way; 
and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.  On 
both, the burden of proof is on the defendant.”66 
 
 The St. Pierre formulation, considered further below, established that a 
stay of proceedings would generally be refused even in the scenario where neither 
party was resident in or otherwise closely connected with England and the cause 
of action related to events which had transpired abroad.67  It reflected an abuse of 
process standardisation whereby the choice of lex fori was not lightly to be 
disturbed, and promoted a more certain template with limited discretion for 
review.  The essence of the doctrine provided that a mere balance of convenience 
did not provide a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of 
litigating the claim in England.  A generous hand of welcome was presented to 
foreign plaintiffs pursuing actions in London, and Lord Denning in typical 
language reflected that this was of great benefit to all respective parties: 
 
“No one who comes to these courts asking for justice should 
come in vain.  The right to come here is not confined to 
Englishmen.  It extends to any friendly foreigner.  He can seek 
the aid of our courts if he desires to do so.  You may call this 
’forum-shopping’ if you please, but if the forum is England, it 
is a good place to shop in both for the quality of the goods and 
the speed of service."68 
 
 Lord Denning’s statement in The Atlantic Star, reflected prevailing judicial 
attitudes focussing on presuppositions, rightly or wrongly at the time, concentrated 
on the ‘innate superiority’ of English justice and her court system.69  It was  only 
when the threshold of ‘vexation’ or ‘oppression’ was categorised that a stay would 
be granted, contrary to earlier deployment of  forum conveniens principles under 
                                                          
66
  St Pierre v South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd [1936] 1 K.B. 382, 398 (Eng. C.A. 
1935). 
67
  See, generally, C.G.J. Morse, “Not in the Public Interest? Lubbe v Cape Plc” (2002) 37 Texas 
International Law Journal 540; and, see, Maharance of Baroda v Wildenstein [1972] 2 Q.B. 
283. 
68
  The Atlantic Star [1973] 1 Q.B. 364, 381-82 (Eng. C.A. 1972). 
69
  See, generally, J. Weiler, “Forum Non Conveniens – An English Doctrine?” (1978) 41 
Modern Law Review 739. 
  18
Scottish law in an inherently discretionary manner.70  A bar to change before 
English courts was the economic benefits attached to London as a centre for civil 
and commercial litigation: 
 
“Although there has been considerable judicial condemnation of 
the practice of forum shopping, it appears in the past that the more 
the claimant has to gain from this practice the more likely he was 
to be allowed to continue his action in England.  This may seem 
curious but it has to be borne in mind that there is a public interest 
in allowing trial in England of what are, in essence, foreign 
actions.  When foreigners litigate in England this forms valuable 
invisible export, and confirms judicial pride in the English legal 
system.”71 
 
 A more liberal and relaxed English approach was eventually adopted by 
the House of Lords in the early 1970s in The Atlantic Star,72 developed further in 
MacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd,73 and in The Abidin Daver,74 Lord Diplock 
confirmed that English law had become, “indistinguishable from the Scottish 
doctrine of forum non conveniens.”75  Lord Reid dismissed the earlier 
‘paternalistic’ views of Lord Denning as, “reminiscent of the good old days, the 
passing of which many regret, when inhabitants of this island felt an innate 
superiority over those unfortunate enough to belong to other races.”76  Judicial 
chauvinism had apparently been replaced by judicial comity, and a few years later 
definitive guiding principles were established by the House of Lords in Spiliada 
Maritime Corporation v Consulex Ltd,77 in a maritime contractual dispute. 
 The principles distilled from Spiliada, and subsequently adopted in 
Lubbe,78 can be stated as follows: 
(i) The basic principle is that a stay will only be granted where the court is 
satisfied that there is some other available forum, having competent 
                                                          
70
  See, for example, Sim v Robinow (1892) 19 Rettie 665. 
71
  PETER NORTH AND J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH’S PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 346-47 (13th ed., 1999). 
72
  [1974] A.C. 436.  The House of Lords, by a bare majority, held that a stay should be granted 
in an action in rem between Dutch and Belgium shipowners which arose out of a collision n 
the River Scheldt leading to the port of Antwerp, and so in Belgian water. 
73
  [1978] A.C. 436. 
74
  [1984] A.C. 398. 
75
  Ibid., at 411. 
76
  The Atlantic Star [1974] 1 A.C. 436, 478 (H.L. 1973) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
77
  [1987] A.C. 460; and, see, in terms of policy critique, J.J. Fawcett, “Trial in England or 
Abroad: The Underlying Policy Considerations” (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
205. 
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jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum (not merely ‘convenient’) 
for the  trial in that case, and where the action can be tried more 
suitably for the interests of  all the parties and the ends of justice.79 
(ii) The defendant has the burden of persuading the court to stay the 
proceedings, though whichever party raises a particular issue must 
prove it.80 
(iii) The burden resting on the defendant is not just to show that England is 
not the natural or appropriate forum, but to establish that there is 
another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate 
than the English forum, otherwise the stay application will be 
dismissed.  By way of illustration, in European Asian Bank AG v 
Punjab and Sind Bank,81 a case involving a dispute regarding a letter 
of credit, having regard to all the circumstances of the action it was 
impossible to conclude that either India or Singapore was a clearly 
more appropriate forum than England for the trial of the action; in the 
circumstances the defendant’s application for a stay would be 
dismissed. 
(iv) The court’s duty is to look for connecting factors such or 
inconvenience or expense at trial, including the availability of  
witnesses, the governing law and the parties’ places of residence or 
business which point to what Lord Keith called in The Abidin Daver, 
‘the court with which the action had its closest and most real 
connection.’82 
(v) If the court concludes at that stage that there is no other available 
forum which is clearly more appropriate for the trial of the action, it 
will ordinarily refuse a stay. 
                                                                                                                                                               
78
  Lubbe v Cape Plc [2000] 1 WLR 12545; and see infra at p. XX. 
79
  [1987] AC 460, at 476 per Lord Goff. 
80
  Ibid. 
81
  [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 356; see, also, Ark Therapeutic Plc v True North Capital Ltd. [2006] 1 
All ER (Comm.) 138; Schapira v Ahronson [1998] IL. Pr. 587 (multistate libel disseminated 
by Israeli newspaper – England an appropriate forum for claimant, an English resident, to 
vindicate reputation even though small sales of offending newspaper within the  jurisdiction); 
and see, also, Zivlin v Baal Taxa [1998] IL Pr. 106; and The Hamburg Start [1994] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 399 (holding Cyprus to be an independent forum where the claim had little connection to 
Cyprus). 
82
  See, generally, Morse, supra n. 66. 
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(vi) If, however, the court concludes at that stage that there is some other 
available forum which, prima facie, is clearly more appropriate for the 
trial of the action, it will ordinarily grant a stay unless there are 
circumstances by reason of which justice requires that a stay should 
nevertheless  not be granted.83  In this enquiry, the court will consider 
all the circumstances of the case, including circumstances which go 
beyond those taken into account when considering connecting factors 
with other jurisdictions: “The possibility cannot be excluded that there 
are still some countries in whose courts there is a risk that justice will 
not be obtained by a foreign litigant in particular kinds of suit whether 
for ideological or political reasons, or because of inexperience or 
inefficiency of the judiciary or excessive delay in the conduct of the 
business of the courts, or the unavailability of appropriate remedies.”84 
 
A properly conducted distillation of extant Spiliada principles reveals a 
casuistic two-stage enquiry.85  The first prong, with attendant burden on the 
defendant, reveals iteration of the requirement to establish that there is another 
available forum abroad that is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the 
English forum.  The old jurisprudence, derived from the venerable St Pierre test, 
wherein only in exceptional cases would an English court stay proceedings 
commenced as of right, has been replaced by a more liberal approach, allowing a 
stay where England is an inappropriate forum.  This involves solipsistic 
consideration of a wide-range of exogenetic factors, with the trial judge as 
empress of this deductive syllogism.86  
  
 Once it has been established that there is a clearly more appropriate forum 
for trial abroad then the burden of proof, under the second prong of the enquiry, 
                                                          
83
  [1987] AC 460, at 478. 
84
  [1984] AC 398, at 411 per Lord Diplock, and adopted by Lord Goff in Spiliada, at 478-79. 
85
  See Fawcett, supra n. 76, at 210 who asserts: “The increased willingness to stay English 
proceedings which has occurred over the last decade can be seen, in the words of Lord 
Diplock in The Abidin Daver [1984] A.C. 398, at 3411, as the replacement of judicial 
chauvinism by judicial comity.  More particularly, the courts have refused to make direct 
comparisons between the system of administration of justice and the alternative forum abroad.  
The courts have also given much less weight to the fact that the (foreign) plaintiff obtains an 
advantage from trial in England.” 
86
  See, generally, Morse, supra n. 66. 
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shifts to the claimant to justify trial in England.  The court, at this juncture, is 
concerned with the issue of whether substantial justice requires that a stay should 
not be granted.87  A minimum standard of justice must apply in the alternative 
foreign forum, and effective access and redress in that venue, the lack of which 
needs to be supported by the existence of cogent and positive evidence.88  A 
degree of replication exists with the federal U.S. standard adopted in Gulf 
Oil/Piper Aircraft, with collinearity in terms of a similar two-stage test, albeit that 
‘amenability’ of the alternative forum is considered at the initial stage, followed 
by extirpation of private and public interest factors.89  Under Piper Aircraft, U.S. 
courts sift through the multiple public and private factors to determine dismissal 
or retention of a case; in England, it is necessary to examine two distinct 
components relating to availability of a better forum and whether the claimant, not 
the forum, would be disadvantaged by dismissal.  A major difference, as 
subsequently considered, is that English courts do not have an overt 
‘discriminatory’ preference for home claimants over alien claimants.90 
 The distinctive features of modern Anglo-American common law rules are 
the broad discretion provided to trial judges without effective appellate review, 
and the flexibility and intuitiveness of a wide range of balancing factors involved 
in the forum non conveniens equation.91  A schism exists with the framework 
provided in a European backdrop to civil and commercial recovery established by 
the Brussels Convention, and now Brussels I Regulation template.92  The 
conceptual edifice mandated is anathema to the very concept of forum conveniens, 
and this hostility has extended tendrils via the European Court of Justice decision 
in Owusu v Jackson.93  The compartmentalised structure was set out by the 
                                                          
87
  Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, at 476. 
88
  See, generally, Hill and Chong, supra n. 14 at 300-301. 
89
  See generally, Petrossian supra n. 9. 
90
  As Morse has cogently stated: “The fact that the claimant would be subject to  different 
procedures or a lower level of damages abroad, for example, is not alone sufficient to 
demonstrate that justice will  not be done abroad.  Regard must be given to all the 
circumstances n a case, but it appears that those circumstances must demonstrate that the 
claimant will suffer serious injustice in the foreign forum before a stay of the English action 
will be denied, including being, in effect, unable to proceed in that forum at all”; supra n. 66, 
at 545. 
91
  See, generally, Alan Reed, “The Rome I Regulation and Reapprochement of Anglo-American 
Choice of Law in Contract: A Heralded Triumph of Pragmatism Over Theory| (2011) 23 
Florida Journal of International Law 359. 
92
  Supra n. 26-27. 
93
  Supra n. 28. 
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Schlosser Report that Title II of the 1968 Convention is based on the rationale that 
a properly seised court under the jurisdictional rule must determine the  dispute to 
which the action relates.94 
 The concepts of discretionary and flexible forum non conveniens 
principles are obfuscated by provisions in the Brussels I Regulation relating to 
actor sequitur forum rei, that the defendant should generally be sued at home, and 
that the first seised court hears the case to the exclusion of other impacted 
venues.95  Principles of harmonisation and communitarianism apply, irrespective 
of connectivity elsewhere or putative natural forum, with all legal systems viewed 
in equipoise as ‘convenient’.96  Forum  conveniens is unique and distinctive to 
England and Ireland, and unknown in the laws of the Continental European 
countries.  The Contracting States are not only entitled to exercise jurisdiction in 
accordance with the provisions laid down in Title II, but they are also obliged to 
do so.  Principles of certainty and party expectations override any search for best 
or ‘most appropriate’ forum for  the respective litigants.97  The Brussels I 
Regulation  reiterates the constriction  whereby the fact that a foreign law has to 
be applied should not be considered a proper reason for declining jurisdiction.98  
The rigid scheme presented in the Brussels I Regulation, and particularised merits 
and demerits in application, are reviewed in the next section.  Recent 
                                                          
94
  The Schlosser Report (1979) OJ C59/71 states: “The idea that a national court has a discretion 
in the exercise of jurisdiction either territorially or as regards the subject-matter of a dispute 
does not generally exist in Continental legal systems”; ibid., at 97. 
95
  See Article 2 and Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation.  Note as Lando has asserted, the 
general rule factor sequitur forum rei draws its rationale from the presumption that the 
defendant, as the party being pursued by the claimant, should be able to fight on ‘home 
ground’ where she can most easily conduct her defence; see Lando, “The Task of the Court of 
Justice and the System of the Brussels Convention” in Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (ed)., Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe (Butterworths, 1992) at 26-
27. 
96
  Note in Robertson’s view, both English and American legal systems should do without broad 
jurisdiction – declining discretion and should uniformly apply the better approach and adopted 
now in the Brussels I Regulation: “In terms of  delay, expense, uncertainty and a fundamental 
loss of judicial accountability, the most suitable forum version of forum non conveniens 
clearly costs more than it is worth.  It sets an unrealistic goal – getting each transnational case 
that arises into the best possible forum for its resolution – which entails a costly and wasteful 
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developments over the course of the last decade have presented individualised 
difficulties for U.S. litigants before English courts, and the full extent or impact of 
the  Owusu decision remains open to conjecture. 
 
 
III THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION AND POST-OWUSU 
IMPLICATIONS  
 
The antithesis of traditional common law discretionary principles is 
presented by the rigid autocracy and mechanistical jurisdiction – selecting 
template provided by Europeanization on jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters between Contracting States.99  The 
Brussels Convention 1968, described by a leading American commentator as, ‘the 
most impressive experiment in supranationalism the world has seen’,100 has 
overtaken and diluted the reach of historical English doctrine to the chagrin of 
some traditionalists.101  It is essentially predicated on practical grounds, and 
establishes an intra-Convention mandatory system of jurisdiction.  Intra-
Convention it may have been intended, but the spatial reach is far wider in terms 
of regulating relations with non-Contracting states, and notable consequences for 
U.S. litigants in terms of civil procedure regulation.102 
The initial Convention, after a period of contemplation and reflection, has 
undergone careful reinterpretation with a revisionist Brussels I Regulation.103  The 
combined effect has been that a pragmatic governing document has been 
promulgated, written on a “clean slate” and based predominantly by Article 2 on 
the maxim actor sequitur forum rei, by which the law leans in favour of the 
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defendant.104  The concept of domicile is a key central element to the ascription of 
jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation.  Pursuant to Article 2, persons 
domiciled in a Contracting State must, in general, be sued in the courts of that 
State, regardless of their nationality.105   
By adopting the domicile of the defendant as a connecting factor, the 
Committee of Experts widened the scope of the Convention by extending the rules 
of jurisdiction to all persons whatever their nationality domiciled within the 
European Union.106  The plea of  forum non conveniens, as stated, was considered 
in the Schlosser Report107 to generally be incompatible with the Brussels 
Convention on the basis that courts were mandated to exercise jurisdiction under 
Title 2: 
 
“The Contracting States are not only entitled to exercise 
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions  laid down in Title 
2: they are also obliged to do so.  A plaintiff must be sure which 
court has jurisdiction.  He should not have to waste his time and 
money risking that the court concerned may consider itself less 
competent than another … the plaintiff has deliberately been 
given a choice, which should not be weakened by the application 
of the doctrine of  forum  conveniens.”108 
 
 
In essence, a vital feature of the Brussels Convention (now Regulation) is 
the drawing of a  particularistic bright-line test of domicile, which is the central 
tenet of the impacted jurisdictional scheme, and proved an irremovable barrier in 
Owusu.109  The template inculcates policy desiderata of legal certainty, 
harmonisation, and functionality, but as stated herein can also produce 
inconsistency, lack of connectivity, and failure to ‘exercise’ venue resolution 
appropriately.110  The question of whether a person is domiciled in the U.K., for 
the purposes of the Brussels Convention, is to be determined in accordance with 
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the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001.111  He is so domiciled if and 
only if: (a) he is resident in the U.K. and (b) the nature and circumstances of his 
residence indicate that he has a substantial connection with the U.K.   The latter 
requirement is rebuttably presumed to  be satisfied if that person has been resident 
in the UK for the last three months or more.  The requirement of substantial 
connection appears to be  understood in terms of duration of the residence, and 
therefore need not be more than minimal, provided that the individual is 
effectively resident in the U.K.  A person will be regarded as resident in a  
particular part of the U.K. if that place is his settled or usual place of abode.112 
The basic approach of the Brussels I Regulation is not radical.  No 
definition of domicile of individuals is provided, so that this remains a  matter for 
each Member State to apply to determine whether the defendant is domiciled in 
that state.  However, Article 60(1) introduces a new autonomous definition of the 
domicile of corporations.  It provides that a company or other legal person or 
association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has its (a) 
statutory seat; or (b) central administration, or (c) principal place of business.113  
The statutory seat means, for the purpose of the UK and Ireland, the registered 
office, or where there is no such office, the place of incorporation, or the place 
under the law of which the formation took place.  It is impossible to sufficiently 
emphasise that the concept of domicile as a jurisdictional touchstone, and 
determination for exercise of venue resolution, lies at the cornerstone for good or 
ill of the European approach. 
The general rule in Article 2 is supplemented by very limited special 
jurisdiction provisions under Article 5, allocating jurisdiction in various categories 
of dispute, where relevant factors ascribe factual  connections between the cause 
of action and the forum.  In a commercial context the most important of these 
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special jurisdictional rules are contractual matters under Article 5(1),114 tort 
[Article 5(3)],115 and disputes arising out of the operation of a branch, agency or 
other establishment [Article 5(5)].116  The special contract rule contained within 
Article 5(1)(a) states that a person domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in 
another Contracting State, “in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the 
place of performance of the obligation in question.”  This general principle is 
modified to an extent by subparagraph (b), which indicates how place of 
performance is to be determined in certain types of cases, specifically contracts for 
the sale of goods and contracts for the provision of services.117  Connectivity to 
the dispute in  tort is provided by Article 5(3), wherein a person who is domiciled 
in a Member State may be sued in another Member State in the courts for the 
place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.118  Internal regulatory 
provisions provide further succour towards a ritualistic jurisdictional framework:  
Article 22 allocates exclusive jurisdiction in mandatory circumstances; Article 23 
covers  prorogation of jurisdiction via the parties’ choice of court agreement;119 
and a strict lis pendens rule is established in Article  27 of first seisure in that any 
court other than the court first seised shall stay its  proceedings until such time as 
the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established.120  This creates a rush to the 
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court house door, irrespective of  natural or appropriate venue, in that once 
adjudicatory jurisdiction is established in the impacted forum, actions brought in 
the court of a second Member State must be stayed and dismissed in favour of  the 
first court.  No forum conveniens evaluation occurs in terms of convenience or 
appropriateness, but procedural efficiency governs over the exercise of 
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.121 
English courts, operating within traditional common law principles, will 
stay proceedings before them in circumstances where the courts of another country 
are clearly more appropriate to determine the dispute.  This is anathema to 
continental legal systems, and the Brussels I Regulation avoids forum non 
conveniens discretion altogether, and acceptance prevails that within the sphere of 
the Regulation it is precluded.122  The logical question that follows is the sphere of 
influence of the Regulation between Contracting States, and by inference its 
reflexive effect123 on non-Contracting States by joinder and other provisions of 
civil procedure.  In this regard the ruling in Owusu v Jackson124 is of vital 
significance in that it was determined that the court of a Contracting State has no 
discretion to decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 2 and 
actor sequitur forum rei governance on the predicate that the court of a non-
Contracting State would be a clearly more appropriate forum. 
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The scenario presented in Owusu represented a fundamental illustration of 
the need for a nuanced and balanced lis pendens investigation.  The plaintiff, an 
English domiciliary, suffered a serious head injury whilst on holiday in Jamaica 
when he dived into waist-deep water and struck his head on a submerged sand 
bank, consequently rendering him tetraplegic.  Proceedings for breach of contract 
were brought in England against the defendant, a fellow English domiciliary,  who 
had let the plaintiff the villa in Jamaica, and he also sued various Jamaican 
companies in tort.125  A stay of proceedings was sought on the basis that Jamaica 
represented a clearly appropriate forum as the ‘natural’ home of the  dispute in all 
genuine senses.  Virtually all the evidence was in Jamaica, the accident occurred 
there, and all claims could legitimately be presented for disposal in one set of 
proceedings in that forum.126 
 Adjudicatory jurisdiction existed against the  defendant in Owusu under 
Article 2 of the Brussels Convention (now Brussels I Regulation).  A preliminary 
ruling was sought from the European Court as to whether a discretionary power 
existed to decline to hear proceedings in favour of a non – Contracting State to 
which connectivity applied.  The matter received perfunctory treatment and the 
essence of the judgment barely covered a full page of text.127  It was asserted that 
forum non conveniens was only acknowledged in a paucity of Contracting States 
(England and Ireland), and to accept it herein  would distort affirmation of central 
uniformity ideals of the Convention,128 an underlying part of its conceptual  
edifice.  Allied to uniformity issues there was an  expression that enhancement of 
the doctrine undermines legal certainty presumptions that formed the basis of the 
Convention and a key objective.129  Discretion provided to a Member State was 
viewed as undermining the key predictability of rules of jurisdiction laid down in 
the governing template and prevented defendants from the protection they needed 
on certainty of suit in the identified legal system.  Moreover, it was determined 
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that the actor sequitur forum rei standardisation in Article 2 was mandatory in 
effect, ‘according to its terms’, and any derogations  from this conscription were 
only those explicitly provided for in the schematic framework.130  In that regard, 
no application for forum  conveniens intuitiveness was provided for in application.  
The direct effect is that within the Brussels I Regulation a seised court is 
prevented from declining the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 on the 
predicate that a Court of a non – Contracting State would be more appropriate, 
“even if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State is in issue or the 
proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting State.”131 
 The implications of Owusu are significant for non – Contracting State 
litigants, particularly U.S. multinationals and individuals, who are brought into 
litigation by joinder provisions or directly engaged themselves in proceedings in 
the first instance.  The impact may be to irrefregably impose not simply an 
overarching internal regulatory system of adjudicatory jurisdiction, but also the 
blunt exercise of that mandate in terms of  full venue resolution.  The deleterious 
impact of this deontological mechanistic jurisdiction – selection, untempered by 
beneficial forum  conveniens discretion, may prove to be inapt for a selection 
lacking connectivity to the actual dispute, an abrogation of natural forum, and 
consequential inconvenience, delays and enhanced costs.132  The full implications 
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of Owusu are yet to be determined, with uncertainty surrounding the pervasiveness 
of the decision as applied to other aspects of the Regulation, and controversy vis-
à-vis the retention in some areas of any discretionary elements.133  The following 
postulations serve to illustrate the level of confusion that remains unabated, 
egregious potentialities for inappropriate venue resolution, and difficulties 
presented for U.S. parties: 
(a) The removal of a discretionary power to stay proceedings may 
produce, ‘blatantly chauvinistic jurisdictional practices against the rest 
of the world.’134  In Owusu,  the five other defendants embroiled in the 
litigational battle were all from Jamaica.  They could, in other 
situations, be U.S. companies.  The commencement of proceedings 
against the initial defendant in accordance with Article 2 provisions 
greatly enhances the likelihood of joinder provisions being activated to 
ensure no fragmentation of processes.135  The likelihood is that U.S. 
parties are far more likely to be haled before an English court for 
actions and decisions taken elsewhere, irrespective of whether the 
London court presents a clearly inappropriate forum: the ‘sound and 
efficient administration of justice’136 standard underpinning European 
Court of Justice reasoning is highly likely to prejudice foreign 
defendants from non – Contracting States without any recourse to  
flexibility to prevent resolutions that shock the conscience.137 
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(b) The position is worsened post – Owusu for U.S. parties by the breadth  
of categorisation of ‘domiciliary’ status for corporations in Article 
60(1) of the Regulation.  It will be recalled that this embraces a 
corporation’s statutory seat, central administration or principal place of 
business.  A corporation effecting tangential  business through 
corporate offices in London may find that Article 2 domiciliary status 
is imbued  to them, and English courts first seised under Article 27, 
with no opportunity to challenge the  ‘exercise’ of jurisdiction in terms 
of a clearly inappropriate forum test or to adduce balanced factors in 
favour of trial abroad.138   
At an individual level, three months residence of any type or quality, 
comports to sufficient connectivity for the Article 2 mandatory 
provisions to apply.  Consider, for example, an action in tort brought 
against U.S. individuals and corporations for negligently causing harm 
to a U.S. national in an amusement theme park in California.  The 
individual defendant satisfies the Article 2 domicile requirement on 
limited jurisdictional touchstones as iterated, and if seised 
fragmentation prevention suggests joinder of parties.  Post – Owusu the 
outcome is that no discretion exists to stay proceedings in terms of 
forum conveniens of a non-Contracting State, even though the whole 
dispute is insulated from a Contracting State in terms of the actual 
nationality of respective parties, adjectival  evidence, location of harm 
and presence of witnesses.139  As Briggs has cogently stated, where 
possible an English court should, “guide itself by the principle of 
forum non conveniens, because, in applying the relevant rules of its 
law, it will be doing precisely what a rational civilian jurist would 
expect it to do.”140 
(c) The central tenet of the Brussels I Regulation involves protection of 
the defendant, by the Article 2 provision the general rule is that they  
should, in terms of fairness and due process, be sued at home.  The 
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litigational battleground is  skewed in their favour in that they should 
not be taken by surprise over venue, they can reasonably anticipate 
being haled into the courts of their home forum in order to defend suit 
within their own particularised legal system.  This presents a  beguiling 
irony that lies at the very heart of Owusu.  Forum non conveniens  
involves the application for a stay of proceedings by the defendant in 
asserting that the impacted venue is  not suitable for resolution of the 
action and that a clearly appropriate forum should prevail abroad.  
Where the defendant applies for a stay in such circumstances then, 
self-evidently, it is equitable for the court to consider the application, 
especially in light of the solicitude behind defendant protection in 
terms of legitimate fora.141  Counter-intuitively, the decision in Owusu, 
obfuscates such principles in, ‘a curious inversion of the normal order 
of priority’,142 prioritisation is accorded to EC claimants over a  home 
defendant.143  If the defendant is unable to  challenge venue resolution 
on appropriateness then contumeliously they are discriminated against 
as set against a non – Contracting State defendant to whom lis pendens 
applies.  Inversion of principle applies and a schism is created in terms 
of international commercial litigation: “To deny the English courts 
(and any others which may wish to do similar) such a power is to 
sanction the risk of forum shopping against an EC domiciled 
defendant.”144  
(d) The European Court of Justice in Owusu declined to answer the second 
posited question, beyond Article 2 mandatory restrictions, in terms of 
whether it is inconsistent with the internal regulatory schematic  
template provided, to decline jurisdiction in favour of the courts of a 
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non-Contracting State in all circumstances, or only in some: and, if so, 
which?  This relates to procedural concerns addressing whether 
bespoke provisions allow limited discretion: in favour of non-
Contracting States in terms of title to land; stays of proceedings in 
terms of choice of court proceedings elsewhere; and where a non-
Member States courts’ are first seised in a dispute involving 
collinearity between litigants and cause of action.145  In such respects a  
number of commentators have articulated that the impact of Owusu is 
restricted to Article 2, and that national principles relating to forum 
conveniens may still have restricted domain,146 and support for this 
proposition exists in terms of a judgment relating to choice of court 
jurisdiction in favour of a non-Member State.147 
 
The reality is that the pragmatic ‘clean-slate’ presented by the Brussels 
Convention and now Brussels I Regulation, abrogating forum  conveniens in 
favour of universality, certainty and legitimate party expectations, has produced 
unfortunate side-effects.  The lack of discretionary influence and equitable 
conscience at the epicentre of functional ‘europeanisation’ stands in contrast to 
Anglo-American traditional common law principles on venue resolution.  
Unfortunately, however, whilst the Brussels I Regulation represents 
‘supranationalism’148 and rigidity in jurisdiction – selection that may operate 
capriciously against non-Member State litigants, the federal standard in the U.S. is 
also inherently flawed in terms of discriminatory treatment accorded to alien 
plaintiffs.149  U.S. multinational corporations have insulated themselves  from 
liability via reverse forum-shopping, deployed inapposite stalking horse 
arguments concentrated on international comity and anti-chauvinism, and this has 
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  See generally, Hill and Chong, supra n. 14, at 330-332; Peel supra n. 130, at 376-377; and 
Briggs, supra n-131, at 381-382. 
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  Ibid.. 
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  See Konkola Copper Mines Plc v Corfomin [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 555 where Colman J. in the 
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exclusive jurisdiction clause supererogatory effect in favour of a non-Contracting State, 
consequentially facilitating a stay of proceedings pursuant to Article 23. 
148
  See Juenger, supra n-99. 
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  See, generally, McParland supra n. 2; and Foley-Smith supra n. 9. 
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been aligned with ineffectual balancing of public/private interests.150  Optimal 
pathways need to be explored in terms of a preferred edifice relating to limited 
forum non conveniens review, and retention of this venerable common law device 
in an efficacious fashion.  A bulwark should be established, as Hartley has 
adumbrated: “The crass insistence that common law rules must be abolished even 
where no Community interest is at stake is the feature of this judgment [in Owusu] 
that will cause most difficulty for lawyers in England.  It seems that the 
continental judges on the European Court want to dismantle the common law as 
an objective in its own right.”151 
 
 
IV U.S. MULTINATIONAL ABUSES AND THE SHIELD OF FORUM 
NON CONVENIENS: TIME FOR REFLECTION 
A. The Federal Doctrine Of Forum Non Conveniens 
 
“When an American party sues another American  party in a 
federal court, at least one thing is  certain: so long as some court in 
the United States has jurisdiction (personal and subject matter) 
over the case, the case will be heard here.  By contrast, when 
foreign parties are involved in litigation in a federal court, whether 
as plaintiffs, defendants or both, there is no such guarantee, even 
where the federal court is properly seised of jurisdiction (personal 
and subject-matter).  While this result may at first appear 
intuitively obvious, the impact of the result on litigation in the 
United States – and the resulting policy-making of courts in this 
process – raises substantial concerns.  If a court is properly seised 
of jurisdiction, why should the parties’ nationality matter? And if it 
does matter, why should the courts be making decisions on this 
issue when Congress has demonstrated its capacity and willingness 
to legislate in this arena.  More narrowly, if a foreign plaintiff sues 
an  American defendant in the district where the  defendant resides, 
should there not be a  presumption that the case should be heard 
there?”152  
 
 The federal doctrine of forum non conveniens in the U.S. has developed in 
a piecemeal ad hoc fashion, and has engendered a skewed most appropriate forum 
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  See generally, Samuels supra n. 3; Jernagan supra n. 9; Karayanni supra n. 11; Gray supra. n. 
29; and Prince supra n. 30. 
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  Hartley, supra n. 129, at 828. 
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  See Samuels supra n. 3, at 1059-60. 
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standard, delineated by discriminatory treatment against foreign plaintiffs.153  The 
template produced has been derided as  parochial and racist in impact.154  The 
consequences, as suggested below, are to implicitly  condone corporate 
malpractice, negligence and  harmful conduct by American multinationals 
egregiously shielding them unduly from liability.155  Behemoth corporations 
perspicaciously gravitate to underdeveloped countries without regulatory  
infrastructures to ‘deal’ with the dumping of harmful products, and are 
deleteriously protected by euphemistic forum non conveniens dismissals.156  The 
reality, on many occasions, is that the case will never be heard at all in the 
identified forum  conveniens, and a ‘cheerful’ wave from the U.S. courtroom ends 
the action.157 
 The historical lineage of the doctrine may be traced back to equitable 
assumptions of venue, and first arose in state law manifestations in the U.S. 
centred around domestic corporate regulation and maritime disputes.158  The 
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  It has been asserted that, “the present test for forum non conveniens – set forth by the Supreme 
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U.S. Human Rights Litigation” (1998) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 41, at 71 
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England.  A Rather Fantastic Fiction” (1987) 103 Law Quarterly Review 398, 418-419 
considering a survey of 180 transnational cases dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds 
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court.” 
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  See Reus, “A Comparative View of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Germany” (1994) 16 Loyola of Los Angeles International and 
Comparative Law Journal 455.  Federal admiralty courts used it to decline jurisdiction over 
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concept received greater recognition following a seminal Columbia Law Review 
article by Paxton Blair in 1929,159 and examination by the Supreme Court in Gulf 
Oil Corp v Gilbert.160  The factual nexus was limited therein in that the epicentre 
of the dispute focused simply upon domestic elements and parties, but 
nevertheless the template applied was adopted as the leading formulation for all 
federal non conveniens dismissals, regardless of whether they were admiralty, 
domestic, or even international cases involving one or more parties from foreign 
countries.  Primordial effect, as iterated in the earlier St Pierre precept for English 
law, was prescribed to the plaintiff’s initial choice of forum which was rarely to be 
displaced unless abuse of process was apparent.161  At the heart of the 
standardisation lay the principle that unless the balance of factors strongly  favours 
a defendant, a court should be  reticent to disturb a plaintiff’s choice of  forum.162  
An abuse of forum standard prevailed in that in no event would the plaintiff be 
permitted to, ‘vex, harass, or oppress the defendant by inflicting upon him 
expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy.’   This St 
Pierre reformulation reflected the original essence of the  equitable balancing 
discretion identified in the doctrinal presumptions, and the trial judge was 
anthropomorphised as empress of the process with their solipsistic calculations 
only reviewable by an appellate court under a  deferential clear abuse of discretion 
iteration.163 
                                                                                                                                                               
suits between foreigners.  See Hartman, “Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the 
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which the defendant is amenable to process, one of which is the plaintiff’s chosen forum, ibid., 
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  Ibid., at 508-509; and see generally, Karayanni supra n. 44, at 335-337. 
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  Ibid., at 509-512.  For criticism of the clear abuse of discretion standard see Friendly, 
“Indiscretion About Discretion” (1982) 31 Emory Law Journal 747, at 748-54. 
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 An exogenetic list of balancing factors were adduced as relevant in 
deciding which  forum the litigation would best serve the  private interests of the 
litigants and the public interests of the forum in question.164  This gallimaufry of 
potentially impacted concerns has produced a standardisation where predictive 
outcome may be as likely as tattooing soap bubbles for litigants, and an 
unfortunate opaqueness in result.  Private factors were ascribed  as embracing: the 
case of access to evidence; the availability of compulsory  procedures for forcing 
attendance of unwilling witnesses; the cost of obtaining attendance of willing 
witnesses; the possibility of viewing premises if appropriate to the action; the  
enforceability of judgments abroad; and all other practical problems that would 
promote an easy, expeditious and inexpensive trial.165  Public factors were stated 
to include: administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion (‘crowded 
dockets’); the public  interest in having local controversies decided at home; the 
public interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum familiar with the 
applicable laws; difficulties in the  application of foreign law; avoidance of  
extensive forum shopping; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated 
forum  with jury and tax duties.166  The reality, of course, is that a strict 
demarcation between private/public factors may be ‘incoherent’ in that a fudged 
coalescence of factors prevails in actual decision-making with the enquiry, 
“differentiating between considerations of geographical convenience, litigation 
efficiency and considerations of substantive justice.”167 
 The dispute in Gulf  was insulated geographically to local parties, but 
subsequently in Piper Aircraft168 a federal standard emerged,  arguably 
xenophobic in derivative nature, and to be adopted where foreign plaintiffs sue in 
U.S. courts.169  It involved a wrongful death action brought initially in a California 
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state court by the representative of the estate of five Scottish citizens killed in an 
air crash in Scotland.  It was alleged against Piper that defective manufacture had 
causally effected the wrongful deaths, and recovery was claimed on the predicates 
of negligence and strict liability.  The plaintiffs enjoined the plane manufacturer 
(located in Pennsylvania) and the American company that manufactured the  
plane’s propeller (located in Ohio) as the  defendants in the action.170  The suit 
was removed to federal court in California, and subsequently transferred to a 
federal district court in  Pennsylvania, where the defendants moved to  discuss on 
the grounds of forum non conveniens.171  This motion was supported by 
defendant’s  claims that numerous witnesses essential to the  defence were 
geographically connected to  Scotland and not subject to compulsory process in  
the U.S., the decedents and their heirs were Scottish citizens, and locational 
evidence at the accident scene centred on Scotland.172  This translated in their 
view to a  clear preponderance of balanced factors in favour of an alternative 
forum  conveniens.  These contentions were met by substantive law concerns 
adduced by the plaintiff, suggesting that dismissal would be inequitable since 
Scottish law determinative to products liability was less favourable than the 
applicable law, and all the evidence concerning the manufacture of the plane was 
located in the U.S.173  Despite the location of the defendant’s corporate 
headquarters a short distance from the trial court, and even though adjudicatory 
jurisdiction applied, the case was dismissed in accordance with the forum non 
conveniens doctrine.174 
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 The federal standard articulated in Piper engages a two-part test.175    First, 
a court must determine whether an adequate alternative forum exists.  If it does 
the court proceeds with the second prong in determining which forum the 
litigation would best serve the private interests of the litigants or the public 
interests of the forum.  In this regard there was confirmation of a shift from the 
abuse of process approach articulated in Gulf Oil to the ‘most appropriate forum’ 
approach in the evaluation of the criteria.176  Moreover,  as subsequently 
determined in Sinochem,177 it is permissible for federal courts to rule on forum 
non conveniens motions even before establishing that the court has adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over the parties or subject-matter of the case, with such dismissals 
viewed as a less burdensome optional pathway.178 
 Unfortunately, the Court in Piper  failed to articulate the essential 
requirement of an ‘adequate’ alternative forum in any meaningful  practical or 
realistic sense.179  As charted below, this has created unfortunate consequences for 
dyspeptic foreign litigants precluded from U.S. court-room doors.  In terms of 
‘adequacy’ the Court simply articulated that: 
 
“Ordinarily, this requirement will be satisfied when the defendant 
is ‘amenable to process’ in the other jurisdiction.  In rare 
circumstances, however, where the remedy offered by the other 
forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an 
adequate alternative, and the initial requirement may not be 
satisfied.  Thus, for example, dismissal would not be appropriate 
where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the 
subject-matter of the dispute.”180 
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The ‘adequate’ alternative legal system presented in Piper was that of the 
U.K., advanced and developed in civil and commercial disputes, but this test has 
transplanted less successfully to alternative fora options in developing nations in 
other disputes.181  Allied to the ‘adequacy’ debate, the Supreme Court in Piper 
totally recast the parameters of a forum non conveniens enquiry in cases involving 
foreign  plaintiffs that institute litigation in the United States.182  Diminished force 
is accorded to a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. forum, and lower federal courts 
must post-Piper Aircraft consider in transnational forum non conveniens litigation 
the very citizenship of the plaintiff: 
 
“When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume 
that this choice is convenient.  When the plaintiff is  foreign, 
however, this assumption is much  less reasonable.  Because the 
central purpose  of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to  ensure 
that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less 
deference.”183  
 
The momentum shift in Piper towards a most appropriate forum balanced 
perspective, but skewed against foreign plaintiffs, represents an obfuscation  of the 
original import behind the equitable  and discretionary formulation.184  The 
legitimate progenitor of the doctrine focused on protection of the chosen forum 
and the defendant from the inconvenience of challenging a dispute brought by the 
plaintiff in a clearly inappropriate forum.  The new overarching incantation, 
allowing  enhanced discretion for a trial judge, deploys considerations of universal 
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convenience and intuitive ends of justice principles.185  The flexibility provided by 
a liberal specific factors myriad replaced the rigid autocracy of an abuse of process 
St Pierre traditional formulation.186 
 
B. (In) Adequacy of Alternative Fora and Avoidance of U.S. Multinational 
Abuses 
 
The controversial nature of the discriminatory U.S.  federal standard of 
forum non conveniens has been identified in a series of high profile cases that are 
set out below.187  The jurisprudential bulwark to liability in Piper has, arguably, 
been deployed in Machiavellian fashion  by U.S. multinationals against foreign 
plaintiffs in less-developed countries who are the  real victims of corporate 
malpractice, negligence, human rights abuses and the unfortunate maxim of  profit 
before principles.188  A form of reverse forum shopping has been circuitously 
transplanted into the equation by large U.S. multinationals in a succession of 
product liability cases to circumvent ‘appropriate’ venue in their home forum.  
The reality, as Robertson and Miller have cogently  identified is that, “Although 
courts and  commentators routinely discuss forum non conveniens as if the issue at 
stake were a choice between competing jurisdictions, in fact, the usual choice is 
between litigating in the United States or not at all.”189  It should be difficult to 
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countenance that  when a plaintiff has selected the  defendant’s home forum, the 
latter ought not to be surprised by being haled into court there;190 moreover, it 
translates to a, “perversion of the forum non conveniens doctrine to remit a 
plaintiff, in the name of expediency to a forum in which, realistically, it will be 
unable to bring suit when the defendant would not be genuinely prejudiced by 
having to  defend at [its] home in the plaintiff’s chosen forum.”191  Pragmatically, 
this  represents the corollary of the orthodoxy enunciated under Gulf Oil/Piper 
Aircraft where the crucial determinant to examine is whether, under ‘adequate’ 
alternative forum juxtaposed with the ‘less deference’ iteration, a presumption 
applies in favour of the foreign forum.  Prejudicial effect is  prescribed to the 
determinant that the plaintiff is not a home resident – this severely restricts  the 
likelihood of a hearing in a state where the U.S. multinational is incorporated, 
even in the vicinity of the trial court.192  The ‘home’  domiciliary status of the 
defendant metaphorically constitutes a perfidiously inverted shield to liability.193 
The unfortunate impact of the  skewed less deferential standardisation is 
exacerbated in personal injury disputes where the preponderance of adjectival  
evidence and relevant witnesses are located abroad in the country where the harm 
occurred.  Pre-eminent interest is wrongly accorded to private interest factors of 
the parties, rather than public policy interests of  the chosen forum in ameliorating 
environmental abuses and dumping of  harmful products.  The difficulties are 
propounded by the conclusion in Piper that a less favourable substantive law in 
the  defendant’s alternative forum will rarely constitute a ground of inadequacy.  
The effect has been that, “the doctrine does not  serve convenience or fairness 
goals but rather serves to insulate TNC’s from responsibility for their actions 
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abroad”, and thereby, a tool  for human rights abuses committed abroad.194  In a 
number of instances, detailed below, it is apparent that multinational corporations 
have marketed to foreign countries products that  have either been banned or 
untested in the U.S., causing severe harmful effects of a widespread nature. 
The forum non conveniens dismissal formula has been perspicaciously 
deployed by  U.S. multinational defendants to bypass internal regulatory laws.195  
The tactical game-playing is tantamount to a piece of modern pageantry as 
disappointed plaintiffs receive a one-way ticket home.196  Defendants have 
invoked the federal standard as a defensive shield in international  litigation, 
fought the venue battle with the  utmost rigour, and resisted legitimate suit in their 
home forum.197  The implicated resonance is that  U.S. fora do not have a 
presumptive interest or public policy engagement  in regulating the sale of 
products beyond their borders.198  This is counter-intuitive, and as argued 
elsewhere should demand a rebalancing of the private/public interest orderings 
established in Piper Aircraft.  It is vital to enervate a strong U.S. interest in 
assuring the safe regulation of American  industry on an international and national 
level.199  Consequently, it is important to  avoid a ‘race to the bottom’200 amongst 
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developing nations soliciting investors: and protection is needed so that they are 
not used as the ‘industrial world’s garbage can’201 and ‘as dumping grounds for 
products that have not been  adequately tested.’202  A sea-change is needed so  that 
inhabitants are not to be used as ‘guinea pigs for determining the safety of 
chemicals.’203 
A significant problem with the federal  standard of forum non conveniens 
has proved to be the ineffective examination of whether an alternative forum is 
truly ‘adequate’ in realistic and practical senses.204  There is a reluctance to 
examine another legal system to identify if the claim will be determined in an 
equitable, timely and impartial fashion.205  Examination transpires at a macro 
rather than micro level with a failure to evaluate what will actually occur in the 
alternative forum, and to challenge concerns of bias, corruption or wrong doing.206  
This  often derives from misplaced and mis-directed incantations of international 
comity and paternalistic imputations, revealed in the evaluation of a series of high-
profile dismissal  cases below. 
In Abdullahi v Pfizer Inc,207 a terrible meningitis, measles and cholera  
epidemic arose in Nigeria where Pfizer was testing drugs on Nigerian residents.  A 
new antibiotic Trovan, unapproved in the U.S., was tested on two hundred 
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children, aged one through thirteen, to include in the experiment.  These tests were 
conducted even though information existed that potential side-effects in children 
included joint disease, bone deformation and liver damage, and even though 
warnings existed that the studies contravened, “international laws, federal 
regulations and medical ethics.”208  Tragically, eleven children died following the 
study and ‘controlled experiment’ and numerous others suffered injuries.  A group 
of Nigerian plaintiffs brought action in  New York against the home defendant for 
multiple violations of international law.  The action was  stayed on forum non 
conveniens grounds with Nigeria viewed as an ‘adequate’ forum, not to be 
displaced on comity grounds amongst other rationales.209  An orator of hard truths 
would  have demanded more than the perfunctory examination of whether Nigeria 
constituted an adequate forum.  The plaintiffs contended that the alternative venue 
lacked, “adequate procedural safeguards” and the “modicum of independence and 
impartiality” required to ensure an effective remedy for the wrongdoing and  
misfeasance.210  There was  additional allegations that within the Nigerian legal 
system a fair trial would be rendered nugatory because of corruption, delay, 
inefficiency and understaffing.211  As Jernagan has cogently identified, these 
disparate inefficiencies and inequities were supported by a U.S. State Department 
report containing findings that Nigeria was not an adequate alternative forum.212  
Interestingly, the  Nigerian courts had disavowed any interest or  intent in hearing 
the dispute, but this factor was disregarded.213  It was not ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to subject the defendant to litigation just outside their front door 
or inconvenient on an abuse of process standard.214 
A vital policy interest is at stake in not allowing U.S. multinationals to 
escape liability: “the United States and its courts have a strong public interest in 
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the behaviour and regulation of U.S.  companies, particularly when U.S. 
involvement is the only way to protect U.S. public policy interests.”215  It is also 
important to properly  address the ‘adequacy’ test within the first prong of Piper in 
matters of transnational litigation.  A failure to properly address financial 
considerations as a bar to suit arose in Murray v British Broadcasting Corp.,216 a 
decision which in many respects is the corollary of Lubbe,217 considered below.  
The action involved a claim for copyright infringement and unfair competition 
brought by the plaintiff against the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).  It 
centred on violations of costume design rights in a well-known and popular 
fictional character, Mr Blobby, a feature of a television programme entitled 
‘Noel’s House Party’.  The estimated cost of the litigation was around £200,000 
and at that point no contingency fee arrangement system operated in English law, 
and the plaintiff could not raise a loan for that  significant sum.  The Second 
Circuit refused to allow fiscus conveniens to trump forum conveniens, and 
determined that, “Murray’s claim of financial hardship may not be  considered in 
determining the availability of an alternative forum but must be deferred to the 
balancing of interests relating to the  forum’s convenience.”218  It is submitted, 
however, that the obverse should be primordial: financial  hardship in Murray 
precluded suit in any  alternative forum and ought to have been part of the 
‘adequacy’ question.219  The primary inquiry should reflect the district court 
perspective in Carlenstolpe220 and whether the  plaintiff’s chosen forum, “is itself 
inappropriate or unfair because of the various private and public interest 
considerations involved.  That [the alternative forum] may have an interest in this 
lawsuit does not in any way alter the fact that plaintiff’s chosen forum also has a 
significant interest in its outcome.”221 
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The reality under the federal standard is that a ‘modicum’ of ‘adequacy’ in 
the alternative legal system has satisfied U.S. courts.222  In Aguinda v Texaco,223 a 
large group of Ecuadorian and Peruvian  plaintiffs sued Texaco, a U.S.-based oil 
corporation in the Southern District of New York.  The central  allegations 
focused around environmental abuse and  personal injury in that the defendant’s 
oil  operations had polluted the rivers and rain forests of Ecuador and Peru.  The 
causal effect was that the plaintiff’s had been, “exposed to  toxic substances….and 
have or will suffer property damage, personal injuries, and increased risks of 
disease including cancer.”224  The case was dismissed on forum non conveniens 
grounds. 
A similar jurisprudential bulwark was presented in Flores,225 a case where 
Peruvian plaintiffs sued an American company for environmental  torts, alleging 
that their mining operations had  caused pollution leading to personal injury in 
violation of international law.  It was determined that the private and public 
interest factors overwhelmingly favoured dismissal.226  This also applied in 
Turedi227 where claims, inter alia, arose that Coca Cola, the American soft-drinks 
manufacturer, had, via their managers at a Turkish bottling plant, hired a branch of 
the Turkish police to inflict retributory injuries (international tort) on former plant 
employees engaged in a peaceful labour demonstration.  International comity 
principles were dubiously raised to suggest that Turkey’s national interest in 
adjudicating the claims far out-weighed that of the U.S.228 
Substantively the court in Turedi, following Piper, rejected lower recovery 
in the alternative forum as significant: “The contention that Turkish law may not 
contain provisions allowing causes of action or remedies  precisely equivalent to 
those Plaintiffs assert in  the instant action [does not] constitute a bar to a  finding 
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that an adequate forum exists.”229  The impact is that U.S. multinational 
corporations enjoy two unfair advantages in the transnational process.  They 
receive financial gain and huge profits from transacting business in less developed 
areas where local residents are precluded from redress for harms at home due to 
ineffective legal, economic and political infrastructures.230  This is correlated with 
U.S. corporations insulated by the federal standard from legitimate pursuit in the 
home forum.231  In deploying an international comity argument, with paternalistic 
concerns vis-à-vis stigmatising the foreign venue as not meeting U.S. standards, 
the outcome is that a fair forum is not achieved on many occasions, but simply 
whether the alternative forum reveals that ‘modicum’ of independence and 
impartiality necessary to an adequate alternative forum.232 
The weighing of the most suitable forum approach, as opposed to the 
abuse of process standard propounded in this article, and adoption of it as a barrier 
to U.S. actions against multinational corporations, was exemplified in sharp focus 
by the Union Carbide case,233 involving the most devastating industrial disaster of 
our time.234   During the early morning hours of December 3, 1984, a lethal gas 
known as methyl isocycanate was accidentally released from a chemical plant 
operated by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, India.  This 
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poisonous chemical caused the deaths of over 2,000 Indian citizens.  More than 
200,000 were injured as a result of this  release.235  Human tragedy arises in 
various guises  and this proved one of the worst illustrations.  Scores of victims 
lived in shanty towns just outside the gates of the Bhopal plant, and little attention 
was paid to the sound of the  plant’s emergency siren on the morning of the leak 
because the plant used this same siren  regularly to signal changes in work shifts.  
In the immediate months following the Bhopal accident 145 purported class 
actions were commenced in federal district courts in the United States on behalf of 
victims of the disaster against Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), UCIL’s U.S. 
parent company.  Eventually these  actions were consolidated by the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and assigned to the  Southern District of New 
York.236  The court, however, weighing the factors suggested by the Supreme 
Court in Gulf Oil and Piper Aircraft, granted conditional dismissal based on 
forum non conveniens.237 
Judge Keenan determined that, ‘no American interest in the outcome of 
this litigation outweighs the interest of India in applying Indian law and Indian 
values to the task of resolving this case.’238  The supererogatory effect was to 
promote international comity consideration to the status of outcome 
determinativeness.239  The court also cited other relevant factors to the dismissal  
solution: the victim’s medical records and the plant’s records regarding 
management, safety and personnel were located in India; the majority of these 
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records were written in the Hindi language; and transportation costs for witnesses 
would have been substantial.  Moreover, the court elaborated upon public factors, 
including crowded U.S. court dockets, and that India had a presumptive interest in 
adjudicating the claims in its courts according to its tort standards rather than 
imposing  foreign (higher) standards upon them.240  It was suggested that the 
Indian government had an interest in responding to a dangerous injury, despite 
protestations to the contrary that U.S.  regulatory standards were appropriate.241 
The Bhopal case is the most important illustration of the impact U.S. 
industry has upon less developed countries’ (at the relevant time frame in India) 
infrastructures leading to serious injury for foreign victims.242  The defendant, 
Union Carbide, was a multinational corporation with headquarters in Connecticut.  
Although the Bhopal pesticide plant was operated by a  subsidiary, Union Carbide 
India Limited, the U.S. based parent company had a majority shareholding in this 
offshoot, and had veto power over many of its policies and practices.  It was also 
determined that the U.S. parent company, ‘supplied the Indian affiliate with the 
overall design for the plant’, and one of its engineers had responsibility  for 
approving the  design when the plant began operations.243  At the  very least the 
parent Union Carbide company had a case to answer for their causal involvement 
in the Bhopal tragedy.  By application of the traditional doctrine, as intimated 
throughout the  article, it was virtually inconceivable that a  defendant could be 
harassed if the litigation playing field was within the defendant’s home ground 
forum.  In such circumstances it would be a rare individual, deploying ends of 
justice arguments, who could invoke the shield of undue inconvenience and 
disturb the equilibrium in favour of original plaintiff selection.  The Union 
Carbide lawyer was so certain of dismissal of action on a  forum non conveniens 
basis that constant reference was made to the federal standard.  The enumerated 
references were so extensive that Judge Kennan called him ‘Johnny one-note.’244  
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This confidence was not misplaced as the New York court held that, “The Indian 
interests far outweigh the interests of citizens of the United States in the 
litigation.”245  In Judge Kennan’s opinion, “The presence in Indian of the 
overwhelming majority of the witnesses and evidence….would by itself suggest 
that India is the most convenient forum for this…..case.”246 
 The Piper standard for forum non conveniens dismissals continues to 
provoke controversy.  It has been deployed by U.S. district courts to defeat foreign 
claims being resolved internally in three high profile cases during the course of the 
last year.  The determination in In re Cadbury Shareholder Litigation247 illustrated 
the tactical utility of the doctrine for foreign corporations transacting business in 
the U.S.  The action involved a challenge by the plaintiffs against the actions of 
the Board of Directors of Cadbury in connection with a hostile takeover bid by 
Kraft Foods Inc., and suit was brought in New Jersey federal court, even though 
Cadbury is  a U.K. company, U.K. law governed the Board’s conduct and the 
bidding process, and none of  the parties resided in New Jersey.  The court 
determined, in accordance with the dual standard articulated in Piper,  the U.K. 
was an adequate alternative forum, that the plaintiff’s choice of New Jersey should 
be granted little deference, and the public and private interest factors weighed in 
favour of the U.K.  It was also acknowledged that manifest differences between 
U.K. and U.S. takeover law, significantly less beneficial to the plaintiff’s action, 
did not detract from the availability of an adequate alternative forum and the 
possibility of redress elsewhere. 
 The civil litigation subsequent to aircraft crashes of Spanair Flight 5022248 
and Air France Flight 447,249 mirror the Piper formulation and reveal the 
continued vitality of the doctrine for good or ill.  In the former case the crash 
resulted in the deaths of 154 people and 18 injured, and consequently 204 
plaintiffs of primarily Spanish citizenship brought 116 wrongful death and 
personal injury actions in the U.S. against U.S. manufacturing defendants, but not 
against Spanair.  The suit was dismissed in district court just a few months ago on 
the predicate that Spain  represented an adequate forum, and significant delays in  
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civil procedure therein pending resolution of criminal proceedings against the two 
mechanics who had worked on the aircraft before the  crash, did not alter the 
outcome.  Similarly, in the latter case suit was dismissed in favour of an 
alternative forum as the court was persuaded by the substantial evidence located in 
France, the plurality of French citizens aboard the aircraft, and ultimately that 
France had a  greater interest in the litigation than that  U.S., and provided a 
‘superior’ forum.  A U.S. plaintiff bringing an action against a foreign defendant 
can expect prima facie weight to  be accorded to their selection of U.S. venue.   
Such respect is contumeliously rejected to foreign plaintiffs suing U.S. defendants, 
in that they are pejoratively relegated to the status of illegal immigrants before 
U.S. courts.250 
 
C. International Comity and Stalking Horse Arguments on Multinational  
Abuse Rectifications 
 
“If comity  as ‘international respect’ is to be regarded as a 
legitimate factor in forum non conveniens cases, it would seem 
more respectful  to other nations to ensure that multinational 
companies based in developed countries such as the United 
States are not allowed to escape the  legal standards of their 
home country by virtue of an unnecessarily liberal forum non 
conveniens doctrine.”251 
 
Principles of international comity have often been equated with 
international respect towards foreign nation states by not interfering in the  legal 
infrastructures of those countries.252  Deference or respect is arguably shown to 
foreign sovereigns by allowing cases to proceed in  their territory for ‘appropriate’ 
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redress.  In Abdullahi, the overriding determinant of a supposed comity interest 
overrode clear evidence that  the ends of justice would not be served in any real 
sense by trial in Nigeria, or indeed Ecuador in Aguinda, Peru in Flores, and 
Turkey in Turedi.  This primordial, but harmful sentiment, was clearly 
supererogatory  in the Bhopal case, namely, ‘To deprive the Indian judiciary of 
this opportunity to stand tall before the world and to pass judgment on behalf of 
its own people would be revive a history of subservience and subjugation from 
which India has emerged.’253  No doubt such benign paternalistic incantations 
provided great succour to the many Bhopal sufferers who fifteen years after the 
tragedy had  received no financial recompense whatsoever for harms endured. 
Doctrinal principles aligned to international  comity and anti-chauvinism 
have enjoyed a lengthy period of gestation, of an antediluvian  nature dating back 
to Holland in the seventeenth  century.254  The concepts received judicial support 
in the U.S. in Hilton v Guyot when Justice Gray asserted that, ‘Comity….is the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation.’255  Unfortunately its application in 
the forum non conveniens substantive arena has been seriously flawed, and has 
allowed local defendants sued by alien plaintiffs to circumvent the legitimate 
jurisdiction of their home forum.256  In Abdullahi, for instance, the U.S. 
multinational  pharmaceutical company should have been held to account locally 
for internal decisions taken at home regarding ‘experimental’ drug trials abroad, 
as the foreign government itself requested.257  By similar accord, it transpired in 
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Piper that Pennsylvania was not a ‘convenient’ forum in which to litigate a claim 
against a Pennsylvania  company that a plane was defectively designed and 
manufactured in Pennsylvania.258  Public interests should dictate that the court 
ought to impose forum standards on home-based monolithic corporations engaged 
in the negligent marketing, design and sales of products abroad.  Lack of respect 
and chauvinism applies, it is contended, when these companies extricate 
themselves inappropriately  from the regulatory and tort standards of the forum.  
Expectations should prevail that  where harm is effected in a foreign territory, but 
the substance of the tortious conduct is causally linked to actions determined 
within  home borders, then ‘true’ as opposed to ‘false’ comity demands redress 
internally as no ‘abuse of process’ occurs via home resolution.259 
The reality is that a game of ‘international  chess’ applies with comity 
arguments, deployed by egregious defendants as a stalking horse.  The rhetoric of 
comity is deployed to ‘check-mate’ unfortunate foreign litigants from seeking  
redress in the U.S.260  No clearer illustration of this international chess game – 
shifting can  be provided than the strategic activities in Bhopal.  Union Carbide 
unstintingly praised the overwhelming merits of the alternative Indian legal 
system in federal district court.  The ‘quality’ of the alternative system must have 
deteriorated extraordinarily quickly as when the dispute was deposited on the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, Union Carbide representatives, 
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‘wantonly assailed the dignity and authority of the Indian Supreme Court.’261  
Tactically, the true feelings and public interests of foreign governments are a 
pawn in litigational disputes, and their genuine concerns are obfuscated by 
rhetoric and strategy.262 
A number of academicians have supported the current federal standard, 
and less deferential treatment accorded to foreign plaintiffs, notably Weintraub263 
and Reynolds264 who are also significant proponents of contrary arguments on 
comity and  anti-chauvinism.  Their arguments when  distilled adopt the following 
considerations: it would be inappropriate to interfere with foreign countries’ 
regulatory and legal  infrastructures indirectly via  forum non conveniens;265 U.S. 
laws, policies and social  mores should not be exported;266 empowerment of 
foreign nations incorporates improvement organically without U.S. interference or 
assistance;267 the threat of ‘massive damages’ accruing from an accident in the 
U.S. already compels perspicacity on corporations to follow a high level of care at 
their U.S.  facilities;268 the U.S. must not become a ‘magnet for the afflicted of the 
world’269 through the clear adventitious benefits to the litigants of lower costs and 
higher recovery; and concerns over loss of an economic advantage and stable jobs 
in subjecting U.S.  multinationals to U.S. regulatory standards when operating in 
less developed countries, ‘subjecting U.S. defendants to suit here by foreigners 
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injured abroad places our companies at a world-wide competitive 
disadvantage.’270 
The arguments presented by Weintraub and Reynolds, have been adopted 
and extended in recent literature in support of the federal standardisation.271  A 
number of commentators have decried that it is not for the courts of the United 
States to, “serve as arbiters to the world”,272 that, “United States taxpayers should 
not bear the burden of an increased case load in United States courts because 
legislators of other countries are attempting to push cases, properly belonging in 
the foreign forum, into  the United States”,273 and as the dispute is not concerned 
with protecting the rights and property of the forum’s taxpayers.  Consequently, 
“the case more properly belongs in the plaintiff’s home country where he has  
contributed to the maintenance of the courts.”274  These arguments are aligned to 
concerns, endorsed and supported by U.S. multinational corporations, that U.S. 
courts represent ‘easy targets’ for forum shopping by alien plaintiffs abroad with 
attractions of extensive pretrial discovery, jury trials, contingency fee 
arrangements and higher damage awards.275  This coalesces with pre-emptive 
jurisdiction in some Latin-American countries such as Guatemala, Nicaragua and  
Panama to transmute cases back to the U.S.  through manipulatively shutting their 
courtroom doors to home plaintiffs.276  In such circumstances, Stanton-Hill has 
argued for conditional forum non conveniens dismissals without jurisdiction so 
that foreign plaintiffs are compelled to rely on their ‘native’ jurisprudential 
systems for any remedies: 
“By accepting claims that should be dismissed for forum non 
conveniens, the United Stated federal courts effectively 
condone the short-sightedness of developing countries.  Rather, 
a basic sense of logic and fairness demands that developing 
countries open their courthouse doors – by whatever means 
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necessary – to shoulder a portion of the legal claims that arise 
from their conscious choice to embrace industrialization and 
welcome foreign multinational outfits.  In the modern world 
where no single person is insulated from an international tort 
feasor, a competent and convenient judicial forum from which 
to seek relief becomes a natural right of human existence.”277  
 
 The arguments that have been advanced by proponents of the U.S. federal 
standard and articulated policy arguments of comity, paternalism  and anti-
chauvinism, set out above, do not outweigh the deleterious consequences implied 
by that  standard for deserving victims of malpractice, international torts, and 
abuses.  American regulatory frameworks ought to apply to corporations 
domiciled therein, but also be operative in developing nations through diverse 
strands of their  hierarchical enterprise  Weinberg’s aphoristic  statement has a 
particular resonance in this context that, “[W]ords like comity, reciprocity, and 
mutuality, having a deceptively right ring, like good breeding and sweet 
disposition.”278  When applied to forum non conveniens the concept of comity has 
a hollow sound.  The forum non conveniens inquiry must be refocused to more 
closely approximate the doctrine’s original intent.  As stated below, the equitable 
conscience of the doctrine that underpins the discretionary test, derived from 
inconvenience to the parties needs to be revived, with a return to the traditional 
equipoise between domestic and alien plaintiffs.  A template is provided by the 
extant  approach adopted by the High Court of Australia in Voth,279 a test based on 
‘clearly appropriate’ forum-selection.  It is deeply implausible  to suggest that 
state relations are threatened by breaches of international comity: it is a  brutum 
fulmen to iterate that a foreign  government would be affronted by their citizens 
being allowed to recover damages abroad against U.S. multinational 
corporations.280 
 Comity and anti-chauvinism have been employed by U.S. defendants in a 
strategic fashion and do not merit the eminence grisé currently accorded, nor 
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should they obfuscate a genuine and proper inquiry into whether the alternative 
forum is ‘adequate’ in a practical  and realistic manner.  Modern developments 
have blinded the requirement to establish injustice to the defendant, and allowed 
instead a myriad of ethereal and uncertain specific-interest factors to be 
presumptively used to allow a defendant to  obtain a stay of proceedings.  Indeed, 
Prince has cogently highlighted that, forum non conveniens is now, “such a 
straight forward mechanism for obtaining a dismissal – especially in the United 
States – that a defendant’s lawyer could rightly be accused of negligence if they 
did not seek to employ the doctrine, particularly against foreign plaintiffs.”281  The 
original rationale of the doctrine needs to be re-examined, and a fresh reappraisal 
of the nature and importance of public interest analysis as part of an intellectually 
coherent juxtaposition between jurisdictional and choice of law precepts. 
 
V ANGLO-AMERICAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTEREST  
FACTORS: A GALLIMAUFRY OF EXOGENETIC INFLUENCES 
  
“The doctrine of forum non conveniens  is not a neat divider, 
like a fence, which separates the cases where jurisdiction 
should be retained from those where it should not.  Instead, it 
meanders, like a river; and as a river with time may change its 
course by the erosion and build-up of its banks, so too the 
judge-made doctrine of forum non conveniens develops new 
twists and bends, shrinking and growing as it confronts novel 
factual situations.”282 
 
 When foreign disputants submit to English jurisdiction over their action 
then courts are prepared to advance the forum’s interest in trial in England.  If, 
however, the defendant objects and applies for a stay the  court must apply the 
Spiliada factors to identify the most appropriate forum in consideration of all the 
circumstances of the case, the interests of the parties and the ends of justice.283  
Reciprocal principles apply within the  contextual purview of the U.S. federal 
standard, articulated in Piper, which incorporates an ethereal myriad of private 
and public interest conditions.  In determining whether the balance tips in favour 
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of the claimant’s choice or a foreign forum may depend upon the extent of the 
American tortfeasor’s involvement in the alleged tortious conduct, adduced 
concerns of international comity or anti-chauvinism, or the residence of the 
litigants.  Lord Templeman, presciently identified in Spiliada that, “the factors 
which the court is entitled to take into account in considering whether one forum 
is more appropriate are legion.  The authorities do not, perhaps cannot, give any 
clear guidance as to how these factors are to be weighed in any particular case.”284  
A range of epigenetic influences on venue selection in the U.S. has made 
prediction uncertain, and as Stein has stated the  result has been, “a crazy quilt” of 
ad hoc, capricious and inconsistent decisions.285 
 
A.  Applicable Law and Intellectual Coherence 
 
It is submitted that a vitally important development in this arena will be to 
refocus the connectivity between venue selection and applicable choice of law 
principles.286  The relevance of choice of law, as a public interest balancing factor, 
was articulated by the Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft, but has subsequently been 
downgraded in impact.287  Intellectual coherence should demand a functional  
reappraisal of their coalescence in  pragmatic reconsideration of the doctrine,288  
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and to assist arbiters towards effective resolution of the trial within a trial nature  
of forum conveniens litigational battles.  This review ought not to be blinkered to 
the place where the injury occurred, but should address a ‘progenitor of harm’ 
perspective, addressing causally an evaluation of the locality where causally the 
harm-inducing conduct transpired, or elements of contractual  breach were set in 
motion.289  This would facilitate an evaluation of whether the cause of action can 
be  correlated to the defendant contracting to supply goods or services within the 
state, in a tortious sense the focus would be on whether the defendant caused in a 
broad sense the tortious injury within the ‘impacted’ state by act or omission.290 
Alignment of jurisdiction, venue resolution and choice of law principles in 
private international law have proved enduringly controversial.  It is contended, 
however, as Briggs has asserted that,  ‘even today we still look at choice of law 
and on jurisdiction as if each was self-contained and neither was coloured by the 
other’, choice of law [is] a stepping stone to determining jurisdiction, not the other 
way round.’291  Weintraub has also bemoaned the failure to link  together 
synergous branches of law, “some of the  most unfortunate statements in the 
jurisdictional  decisions of the Supreme Court are those denying a relationship 
between jurisdiction and choice of  law.”292  The time is ripe to reappraise the 
forum non conveniens balancing test away from the private interests of the parties 
(often U.S. multinational corporations), but enhance the public interests of the 
impacted venue state in terms of the forum inquiry and with enhanced extirpation 
of applicable law where connectivity is indicated to the home forum.293 
In terms of a nuanced connectivity approach to applicable law it is public 
‘interests’ of the impacted state that ought to be primordially centred in the venue 
selection process.  When we refer to choice of law, we are addressing the 
requirement of a  policy selection process that, in multistate cases, necessitates a 
selection amongst forum policies facilitating systemic and functional concerns as 
well  as the primary substantive issue of which party  should prevail on the 
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merits.294  The connectivity  with the venue resolution choice should be  
irreducible.  In essence, the forum court extrapolates practical, substantive and 
systemic values to implicate its law selection.  The forum court, operating as a 
repository of justice, causistically implements values into its decisions.295  The 
aim of choice of law is to provide an intelligible and principled basis for  choosing 
a substantive rule in tort or contract over the competing rule of  another place.296  
It legitimizes the overarching choice and explains why rejection of one law in 
favour of another is correct, in replication of why one venue is preferable to 
another.297 
Anglo-American jurisprudence in tort choice of law has, over a span of 
time, considered the  applicability of a variety of legal systems.298  In broad terms 
support existed for either the lex fori (the law of the forum) or the lex loci delicti 
(the law of the place where the tort was committed), or that these two perspectives 
be inter-twined.299  Dissatisfaction, however, with such jurisdiction-selecting 
rules, definitively linking widely defined legal categories with a given territory via 
the mechanism of so-called  connecting factors, facilitated the U.S. revolution in 
choice of law principles through development of the proper law of the tort analysis 
and spawned government interest analysis.300  This allowed more 
consequentialistic reasoning in that the court was  to focus upon the policies 
expressed in the rules of substantive law in apparent conflict and analyse the 
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respective state interests in having their imbued policies applied to a factual 
scenario not confined to that one state.301 
A cornerstone of government interest analysis is  that a single mechanical 
formula does not produce satisfactory results when applied to all kinds of  torts 
and to all kinds of issues.  The spatial reach  of local law, whether a state has a 
legitimate interest in the application of its own law to a specific case, is predicated 
upon the underlying policy (legislative intent) behind the law and the effectuality 
of applying that policy or interest to the facts at hand.  It will be immediately 
apparent that the pre-eminent jurisprudential policy concern here is flexibility; 
government interest analysis allows different issues to be segregated  to facilitate a  
more adequate extrapolation of relevant social factors involved.302  In part, this 
analysis was adopted by the American Law Institute’s Restatement Second of the 
Conflict of Laws 1968.303  It was laid out therein that, ‘the rights and liabilities of 
the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the 
state which, as to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence 
and to the parties.’ 304 
The attraction of a broadly defined ‘interest’ analysis is that it may allow 
flexible results, consequently avoiding outcomes that would offend our common 
sense.  The sophistication  of the required critique of ‘interests, ‘policies’ and  
dépecage of issues should coalesce together with the  myriad of ethereal 
private/public concerns vis-à-vis appropriate venue resolution to provide an 
intellectually coherent framework.305  The demerits of  such a solipsistic approach 
are, of course, perceived loss of certainty, predictability and uniformity of result 
which are claimed to  follow from the application of a rigid jurisdiction-selecting 
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rule of a lex loci delicti governing system.306  In this regard a new intellectual 
framework for tort and contract has been provided within a European landscape by 
the important propagations of the Rome I and II Regulations relating to choice of 
law in contract and tort.307  The harmonised and communitarian perspectives 
therein can beneficially be considered in terms of ‘connectivity’ to Anglo-
American forum conveniens.  It is contended that the public interest of applicable 
law ought to be at the very forefront of any venue resolution balancing discretion. 
The essential aim of the Rome II Regulation is to allay together 
considerations of certainty and  flexibility.  It has opened up a brave new world for 
European litigation practitioners dealing with non-contractual disputes in civil and 
commercial matters containing a foreign element.  As of 11 January 2009, all 
Member States with the exception of Denmark, must apply the Rome II 
Regulation to choice of governing law proceedings, and its rules apply to  events 
giving rise to damages occurring after 19 August, 2007.308  The breadth of the 
Regulation is impressive.  Chapter II contains the overarching primordial rule for 
all torts (art. 4), with prescriptive special rules on product liability (art. 5), unfair 
competition (art. 6), environmental damage (art. 7) infringement of intellectual 
property rights (art. 8) and industrial  action (art. 9); and subsequently specific 
provisions to compartmentalise unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio, culpa in 
contrahendo, and certain transitional rules.309 
The foundational edifice of the new structure is built around the residual 
rule contained in art. 4, which applies unless otherwise provided for in the 
Regulation, to identify the law applicable to  a non-contractual obligation arising 
out of a tort/delict.  The general rule of art. 4(1) is a presumption in favour of the 
lex loci delicti, which  is defined as the law of the place of the injury where the 
damage occurs (lex loci damni) – the law of the country in which the damage 
occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred, and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect 
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consequences of that event occur.310  The place where damage occurs is 
consequently  narrowly constrained, and the lex loci damni rule is said to strike a 
fair balance between the interests of the respective parties, and to reflect the 
modern approach to civil liability and the development of systems of strict 
liability.311  The general rule is followed in art. 4(2) by a displacement exception 
in favour of the parties’ common habitual residence, and a flexible escape clause 
[art. 4(3)] allowing the applicable law to be guided by an alternative choice where 
the tort is manifestly more closely connected with another country.  The ambit of  
this escape clause is unclear, but the purpose is to allow the court, “to adapt the 
rigid rule to an individual case so as to apply the law that reflects the centre of 
gravity of the dispute.”312  An illustration of a manifestly closer connection with 
another country might be provided by a pre-existing relationship between the 
parties that is  closely connected with the tort in question.313  It may facilitate 
consideration, as suggested earlier, of the ‘progenitor’ of the harm where causally 
the harm-inducing conduct transpired.314  The residual general rule is reflective of 
general practice, and the stated aims of  European harmonisation and certainty in  
approach, but discretion applies in limited spheres, and certain areas remain open 
to solipsistic determination.  The following postulations represent a vignette of the 
potential operation of art. 4., attendant difficulties for practitioners, and the 
potential for a sybaritic relationship with jurisdictional competence and 
connectivity:315 
(i) A football match in Spain is negligently policed locally and a number of 
English fans are severely injured.  In English domestic law terminology 
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they are primary victims.316  Unfortunately a number of relatives of these 
injured parties watch the sad events unfold on television and consequently 
suffer nervous shock (secondary victims).317  They seek advice on 
applicable choice of law principles under the new Regulation.  The 
residual rule in art. 4 adopts the lex loci damni and not the event giving 
rise to the  damage or where indirect consequences occur.  It is submitted, 
however, addressing public interest policy concerns that English law ought 
to apply to such nervous shock victims, albeit art. 4 is not specific, by 
focusing on local damage to the claimant(s).318 
(ii) Perishable goods are negligently transported through France, Germany and 
Belgium.  On arrival in England they are found to be rotten.  It is not 
possible to identify the situational source of damage in point of  time.  The 
default principle would suggest English law as the applicable law as lex 
loci damni (identifiable physical damage). 
(iii) Mining operations in the Swiss Alps cause an avalanche to occur in the 
French Alps injuring English tourists.  In accordance with art. 4(1) the 
injurious conduct (events giving rise to the damage) occurred in 
Switzerland, the indirect consequential loss occurs in England, but the lex 
loci damni  and applicable law is French, as the place of harmful physical 
impact.319  The displacement exception and escape clause are inoperative. 
(iv) An English employment agency (central  administration in London) 
recruits personnel to work abroad.  The claimant, habitually resident in 
England, is hired to work in Germany on a building development.320  
Unfortunately, she is seriously injured on the development, and no safe 
system of work was in place.  In such a scenario the harmful physical 
impact (lex loci damni) occurs in Germany, but the displacement exception 
                                                          
316
  See Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 A.C. 310. 
317
  Ibid. 
318
  See generally, Hill and Chong supra n. 14, at 598; and see Alan Reed, “Special Jurisdiction 
and the Convention: The Case of Domicrest Ltd v Swiss Bank Corporation” (1999) 18 Civil 
Justice Quarterly 218. 
319
  In jurisdictional terms the European Court of Justice determined in Case21/76 
Handelskwekerij GJ Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace S.A. [1976] ECR 1735 that the 
plaintiff within Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (now Brussels I Regulation) could 
elect to sue either at the place that damage occurred or the event giving rise to the damage. 
320
  See Johnson v Coventry Churchill International Ltd [1992] 3 All E.R. 14. 
  66
in art. 4(2)  can apply given the party’s common habitual  residence in 
England, and thus prescribe the  applicability of English law. 
(v) An architect, habitually resident in England, negligently prepares building 
plans which are forwarded to France, and then received and relied upon to 
their detriment by English clients in Spain.321  This conundrum presents 
several  difficulties in regard to the tort of negligent misrepresentation.  
Does harm occur where the  report is prepared, transmitted or received and 
relied upon?322  The lex loci damni may arguably constitute Spain where 
reliance occurs, but would the art. 4(2) displacement occur  given the 
parties’ common habitual residence?  Moreover, could the art. 4(3) escape 
clause be supererogatory over either art 4(1) and art. 4(2) if England is 
identified as being manifestly closer connected to the negligent 
representation tortious conduct: progenitor of harm principles would align 
herein with jurisdictional competence and venue resolution.323 
 
The maelstrom of European harmonisation of private international law 
principles has continued unabated: the Brussels and Lugano Convention templates 
for jurisdiction and enforcement have been extended into the field of choice for  
law via the effects of the implementation domestically of the Rome Convention 
and continuation of the work on unification.324  This harmonisation process has 
been further enhanced, and crystallised,  by the direct effect given in 2009 to the 
Rome I Regulation for contractual obligations.  The schematic template adduced 
provides for  party autonomy in terms of express and implied choice, mechanistic 
rule-selection with deontological ascription in eight prescribed linking 
circumstances, and fundamentally the utilisation of the  ‘characteristic 
performance’ focal epicentre test.325  The concept of ‘characteristic performance’ 
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has Swiss derivations, and quintessentially identifies the ‘true seat’ of the 
contractual agreement.326  It essentially links the contract to the social and 
economic environment of which it will form a part.327  The synergistic link to 
venue resolution in contractual disputes should be self-evident in terms of 
appropriate connectivity and intellectual coherence.  In Kaye’s view reference to 
the ‘essence of the obligation’ and ‘essential links’ harbour that the policy 
approach to be adopted is that of identifying the obligation whose character is the 
overwhelming feature of the contract, notably that which, “involves activities 
which are called upon in society and commerce as being essential to the 
maintenance and development of the fabric of national and international socio-
economic co-existence including the channels of finance.”328  By way of 
illustration, in bilateral contracts the counter-performance by one of the parties 
which  usually takes the form of money payment, is not the characteristic 
performance.  Rather, it is the performance for which the payment is due, such as 
delivery of goods, the provision of a service, insurance, banking operations and 
security, which constitutes the socio-economic function of the transaction.329  The 
supposition is that in these discrete categories it is the party whose performance is 
the characteristic one who has the more active rôle to play, and, thus, it may 
reasonably be supposed, is the more likely to need to consult the law during 
performance.  The concomitant is that it is generally reasonable to prioritise their 
convenience in being able to rely on their forum’s law, subject to limited 
displacement where closest connection is elsewhere.330  The contract may be 
territorially insulated  both in terms of jurisdictional venue and applicable law via 
deployment of conjoined connecting factors and prioritisation of public interest 
considerations.331 
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The coalescence of natural forum and applicable law presents encomium 
solutions since, “it contributes towards an efficient administration of justice if trial 
is held in the country whose law is to be applied.”332  The corollary is that if an 
English court has to apply a foreign law, then it must grapple to decipher the 
guiding framework of the foreign legal system: presumptively it raises the 
challenge on numerous occasions of delineation between competing foreign expert 
witnesses, and consequentially wasting judicial times and resources with attendant 
litigational delays.333 
If the posited applicable law is English, this is a significant transmutation 
factor to provide important succour for the trial to be held in England.  Avoidance 
of trial abroad takes on heightened significance, given that the foreign court will 
face recurring problems concerning the efficient administration of justice, 
necessitating the proof of English law.  This factor, quite legitimately, has proved 
decisive  in a series of precedential authorities.  In E.I du Pont de Nemours,334 a 
case involving product liability insurance contracts, where the proper law 
controlling the Lloyd’s policy, the lead policy, was English and notice of potential 
claims was to be given to Lloyd’s brokers, and consequently it was established 
that England was clearly the more appropriate forum for trial of the action.  This 
was mirrored in both Cleveland Museum of Art v Capricorn Art International 
S.A.335 and The Lakhta.336  The former involved a  large reliquary which was not 
returned under a loan agreement governed by the law of Ohio, and this was 
crucially significant in the eyes of Hirst J, in staying English proceedings in favour 
of the Ohio court as the latter was clearly the more appropriate forum for the trial 
of the action.  In The Lakhta all crucial documents were in the Russian language 
and all witnesses would have to come from Russia, with increased expense, and 
great personal  inconvenience to the court, parties and witnesses.  In identifying 
that Russia would be a clearly and distinctly more appropriate forum for trial, 
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considerable weight was attached to the applicable law in the discretionary 
balancing exercise.337 
A triumvirate of cases have supported the direct connectivity  in English 
law between applicable law in contract and venue resolution: Cadre S.A338 
involved a disputed maritime insurance claim; Dornoch Ltd339 engaged a 
contested reinsurance concern; and Bear Sterns340 the validity of a contract in 
English law.  In each precedential authority the connection of the applicable law 
as a primordial factor towards identification of the natural forum was explicitly 
identified: ‘the issues in this case are essentially concerned with the  application of 
English law principles…this factor greatly strengthens the case for saying that 
England is the appropriate forum’;341 in Dornoch it was iterated as a ‘powerful’ 
factor; and in Bear Sterns it provided a ‘distinct’  advantage in determining the 
issues between the parties.342  The applicable law that givens the contractual 
dispute represents a vital  public interest matter in determination of the natural 
forum. 
As previously stated, a number of leading American commentators have 
lamented the lack of connectivity in private international law between different 
branches of the discipline: “The affinity between personal jurisdiction analysis and 
choice of law analysis – which gives great consideration to a state’s interest in 
having its laws applied to a dispute – is one that the Supreme Court has 
unfortunately never endorsed.”343  On occasions, however, the rubicon has been 
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crossed and a passing nod to connectivity has beneficially been promulgated in 
terms  of public interest analysis.  By way of illustration in  McGee v International 
Life Insurance Co.,344 still a leading case on contract jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court determined that in evaluation of a forum non conveniens balancing exercise, 
the state of California had a ‘manifest interest in providing effective means of 
redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims’;345 and in the 
context of libel the Supreme Court in Keeton346 evaluated whether the  residents 
of New Hampshire had a, ‘legitimate interest in holding the respondent 
answerable on a claim related to their activities’347 and in Calder348  the 
terminology of interest analysis was also deployed in the context that the lex fori 
presented a natural forum to hear libel proceedings brought by a California 
resident because the ‘effects’ of the conduct would be considered within the home 
forum.349  The ‘place of the tort’ rule was also transplanted into the natural forum 
test in Lewis v King,350 an English action for libel, where it appeared irrefragable 
to the court that the ‘harm’ principle applied to forum non conveniens.351  This 
was in a scenario where the plaintiff’s domicile and thus presumably the place 
where the claimant’s reputation was primarily damaged coincided.352 
The applicable law public interest factor  should be of vital significance to 
the forum non conveniens balancing equation.  The import and policy rationale 
behind connectivity, intellectual coherence and a wider progenitor of harm 
perspective have been advanced at length in this section; the other exogenetic 
indicators that follow are deconstructed more briefly.  Decisions about what is 
convenient to the court inevitably contain judgments about the forum’s connection 
to the litigation and necessarily implicate the state’s interest in the application of 
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its substantive policies.353  Substantive concerns ought to be casuistically distilled, 
and factoring them into the forum non conveniens calculus is consistent with the 
doctrine’s rôle as an equitable, discretionary and unique litigation – allocation 
device.  It shows  a maturity and solicitousness in doctrinal  perspective that sadly 
has been lacking in federal and state court developments.354 
 
B Fiscus Conveniens and Court Delays 
An important dichotomy prevails in Anglo-American treatment of 
impecuniosity and cost factors as part of the forum conveniens balancing template.  
The position in English law was clarified by the House of Lords in the significant 
decision of Lubbe and Others v Cape plc,355 with their Lordships rejecting public 
interests in favour of private interests of the parties, at least in their judicial 
pronouncements.  The reality, however, was rather different as ultimately the 
dispute demanded reconciliation of explicit policy interests of a very public 
nature.356 
The action in Lubbe was brought initially  by five individuals, 
representative of test cases for 3,000 South African victims of asbestos-related 
disease.  The scale of the action, and suffering of the unfortunate victims, mirrored 
the Bhopal tragedy which entered global consciousness.  The focus of the 
complaint centred around the contention that the defendant as a parent company 
had failed to effect its duty or care to comply with appropriate standards of health 
and safety when carrying out overseas business via subsidiaries.  Laws regulating 
the use of asbestos existed in the U.K. from 1931, but the conditions at Cape’s 
asbestos mining operations in South Africa were regarded as appalling and 
inhumane.  A government health inspector, Dr Gerritt Schepers observed: 
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“Exposures were crude and unchecked.  I found young children 
completely included within large shopping bags, trampling down 
fluffy amosite asbestos, which all day long came cascading down 
over their heads.  They were kept stepping down lively by a burly 
supervisor with a hefty whip.  I believe these children to have 
had the ultimate of asbestos exposure.  X-ray revealed several to 
have asbestosis with corpulmonale before the age of 12”357 
 
 The substantive claims, as stated, were based principally on the negligent 
control of the company’s world-wide asbestos business from England and failure 
to take measures to reduce asbestos exposures to a safe level.358  Venue resolution  
became the litigational battleground and subsequent litigation was hard fought on 
all sides.  Lord Bingham, who delivered the leading judgment,359 was quite 
explicit that South Africa, the focal epicentre of relevant adjectival evidence, was 
clearly and distinctly the most appropriate forum to hear the case (first limb of 
Spiliada).  However, interests of substantial justice (second limb) persuaded the 
court that the stay action should be refused.  The plaintiffs had no effective means 
of obtaining essential  professional representation and vital expert evidence to 
justify proceedings in South Africa with no legal aid possibility.  The procedural 
novelty of the action, if pursued in South Africa, persuaded him that overarching 
disincentives applied to any person or body considering whether or not to finance 
the  proceedings, and legal representation on a contingency fee basis would be 
unavailable.  This aligned together with a deficiency in the South African legal 
system at the relevant time vis-à-vis conducting sophisticated group action 
litigation:  
 
“If these proceedings were stayed in favour of the more 
appropriate forum in South Africa the probability is that the 
plaintiffs would have no means of obtaining the professional 
representation and expert evidence which would be essential if 
these claims were to be justly decided.  This would amount to a 
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denial of justice.  In the special and unusual circumstances of 
these proceedings, lack of means, in South Africa, to prosecute 
these claims to a conclusion, provides a compelling ground, at 
the second stage of the Spiliada test, for refusing to stay the 
proceedings here.”360 
 
 The unanimous decision of the House of Lords in Lubbe to refuse to 
accede to a stay is to be welcome; they were undoubtedly on the side of the angels 
in upholding legal policy concerns that the claims of those who  have not behaved 
in bad faith should be given an airing.  The concentration, however, on fiscus 
conveniens, and the consequential  rejection of overriding significance being 
attached to ‘public’ forum non conveniens factors, flatly contradicts earlier cases 
not referred to in the judgment.  The effect for the dyspeptic litigant is that the 
forum non conveniens balancing equation remains intuitive, subjective and 
amorphous: 
 
“public interest considerations not related to  the private interests 
of the parties and the ends of justice have no bearing on the 
decision which  the court has to make.  Where a catastrophe has 
occurred in a particular place, the fact that numerous victims live 
in that place, that the relevant evidence is to be found there and 
that site inspections are most conveniently and inexpensively 
carried out there will provide factors connecting any ensuing 
litigation with the court exercising jurisdiction in that place.  
These are matters of which the Spiliada test takes full 
account.”361 
 
It is entirely apposite that in Lubbe  an English parent company, a local 
defendant, should fail to obtain a forum non conveniens dismissal for activity 
instigated from their home jurisdiction, and with a ‘progenitor of harm’ 
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connecting to applicable law for negligent decisions within the forum.362  The 
basis of the stay discretion, however, should not be the inherently discretionary 
‘interests of justice’ formula purveyed solipsistically, but rather under the 
alternative template provided by the Australian High Court in Voth, as 
subsequently propounded.363  The claims against Cape PLC were eventually 
settled for around £21 Million, providing some recompense for egregious 
corporate activity.364 Contrary to the views expressed by Lord Bingham and Lord 
Hope in Lubbe, it was ultimately public policy interests, widely defined, that 
produced an equitable outcome facilitated by state legal and procedural framework 
evaluation, and policy interests in funding and facilitation of civil recovery.365 
Public policy interests also arose in terms of fiscus conveniens in Connolly 
v RTZ Corporation,366 a sister-case to Lubbe.  Their Lordships determined that 
where a plaintiff lacks funds to pursue his claim in the alternative forum, but has 
resources to litigate in England, this may, depending on the precise circumstances 
of the litigation, encourage the court to assume jurisdiction, even where the 
foreign forum is prima facie, a more appropriate forum.  The claimant, a British 
subject, was employed for several years by the defendant as a foreman fitter in a 
uranium mine in Namibia.  On his return to Britain, the claimant developed cancer 
of the throat as a result of which he became permanently disabled.  His 
impecuniosity meant that he was not in a position to cover the costs of legal 
proceedings in Namibia, and accordingly issued proceedings against the 
defendants in England, where they were registered and where he was eligible for 
legal aid.  He claimed damages arising from the defendant’s negligence in failing 
to afford protection to its employees from the effects of ore dust at the uranium 
mine.  The battle for venue resolution was invoked.  Undoubtedly, Namibia, under 
the first stage of the Spiliada inquiry, was the country with which  the dispute had 
its most real and substantial connection.  In reply, the claimant asserted that, 
through financial factors, substantial  justice would not be done by trial in 
Namibia.  A classic dichotomy was presented thereby.  Did the impecuniosity of 
this claimant, who was eligible for legal aid as well as benefiting from 
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contingency fee arrangements in one jurisdiction (England), but ineligible in the 
other (Namibia), tip the scales in favour of a refusal to stay.367 
The majority of the House of Lords in Connolly determined that a stay 
should not be granted.368  The availability, or otherwise of financial assistance 
could, as Lord Goff articulated, operate as a determinative factor if the claimant 
could show that substantial justice would not be done if he had to proceed in a 
forum where no assistance was available to him.369  This overriding exception 
applied to Connolly’s circumstances on the predicate that substantial  justice could 
not be achieved in the clearly appropriate forum, Namibia, but could be effected in 
England where the necessary resources were available.370  A number of primordial 
influences impacted upon the stay discretion: (a) that the jurisdiction invoked by 
the claimant was not an extravagant one, for the defendant company was 
incorporated  in England and had its registered office in England;371  (b) that the 
trial could not take  place without financial support; and (c) that the financial 
support available in England was  not sought to obtain a Rolls Royce presentation 
of his case, as opposed to a more rudimentary presentation in the appropriate 
forum.372 
The decision in Connolly in line with Lubbe presents an important 
jurisprudential bulwark to stays of proceedings in English courts.  The conclusions 
reached, in refusing to  accede to a stay in either circumstance is to be welcomed 
and reflects positive affirmation of state paternalism in favour of home forum 
deliberations, albeit skewing a ‘natural forum’ balance equipoise.373  Their 
Lordships, utilising principles of heightened judicial activism to extend the forum  
conveniens doctrine, were on the side of the angels in upholding legal policy 
concerns that promote legitimate ‘amenability’ of forum considerations and 
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outcome determination.  The concentration, however, on fiscus conveniens, and 
the consequential rejection of overriding significance  being attached to a balanced 
forum non conveniens investigation, obfuscated earlier ideals and contradicted 
earlier judicial precepts.374  Whilst, as Lord Goff stated, “the doctrine can be 
regarded as one of the most civilised of legal principles”,375 nonetheless it has also 
engendered a complex web of exogenous influences, pervading uncertainties over 
attribution of legitimate factors, and the generation of litigation to determine 
where exactly to litigate. 
A judicial divining-rod may be needed to assist the litigant through this fog 
of uncertainty.  In Murray,376 for example, a wholly different perspective applied 
to  impecuniosity in U.S. courts.  It will be recalled that the action focused on 
claims for copyright infringement and unfair competition brought by the plaintiff 
before the Second Circuit, and with litigation costs estimated at £200,000 no 
contingency fee arrangement system operated in England, the ‘alternative forum’ 
at the time.  Financial hardship was categorically rejected as a factor in evaluating 
whether an amenable alternative forum to hear the case existed: in any event the 
plaintiff had the option to sell his house and car to fund the matter.377  It did not 
apply to substantial justice in the ambit of amenability, but was deferred for 
consideration, and ultimately rejected, when balancing the private/public 
convenience arguments: “[T]he majority of courts deem a plaintiff’s financial 
hardships resulting from the absence of contingent fee arrangements to be only 
one factor to be weighed in determining the balance of convenience after the court 
determines that an alternative forum is available.”378  This perspective, the 
antithesis of  the English approach, reveals the inherently intuitive nature of the 
forum non conveniens debate, and potential for disparate promulgation of relevant 
factors.379 
This disparity is revealed by contradictory  approaches to delays in 
proceedings abroad in the balancing equation.  Extreme delays may obfuscate the 
potential for a genuine remedy in the alternative forum.  It is impossible to 
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disagree with the statement in Bhatnagar v Surrendra Overseas Ltd that, 
“wherever  the line may be drawn separating tolerable delays from intolerable … 
delays of up to a  quarter of a century fall on the intolerable side of that line.”380  
Delays of up to fifteen years for a case to proceed the Philippine system have 
represented a clear factor for declining the amenability of the alternative forum.381  
Dissonant outcomes, however, may present a beguiling Hobson’s Choice for the 
interested parties.  In The Nile Rhapsody,382 delays in Egypt of four years before 
an action came to  trial were not treated as inordinate, and the court refused to 
make invidious comparisons with foreign systems.  This was replicated in The 
Polessk,383 a case involving a loss of cargo when a Russian vessel sank in the 
South Atlantic.  The court refused to countenance that the parties would not 
receive a fair trial in St. Petersburg through excessive delays in the Russian legal 
system, or that the Admiralty Court in England should be preferred on the ground 
of experience or expertise. 
Delays in the eyes of English courts may, on occasions, receive primordial 
effect as a  relevant factor declining a stay.  In The Vishva Ajay,384 for instance, 
there was a collision between two vessels at a part in India; the Indian court was  
prima facie, the natural forum for the action, in the  sense of being that forum with 
which the action had  the most real and substantial connection.  A substantial  
body of evidence existed that if the case were to  proceed in the High Curt of 
Bombay the trial would be delayed for many years.  Apparently at that  time, many 
actions did not reach trial in less than ten years and it would be wholly exceptional  
for an action to come on for trial in less than six years.385  Delays of this 
magnitude were viewed as a denial of justice.  However, in The Varna (No. 2)386 
delays before the Bulgarian court, self-evidently the forum conveniens for the 
resolution of the dispute focused on a Bulgarian charter-party, were not treated as 
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a significant circumstance making it unjust to grant a stay of the action.  Extreme 
delays can be a decisive factor in the balancing equation, but it is unclear what 
constitutes such a circumstance.387  Recourse is needed again to our  judicial 
divining-rod to provide guidance. 
 
C. Evidential and Procedural Issues 
The list of evidential and procedural issues that may or may not be relevant 
are so indeterminate that virtually no effective guidance is forthcoming; by way of 
illustration a California state court opinion outlined an extensive list containing 25 
factors that could be relevant to a forum non conveniens dismissal.388  The result 
is a doctrine that is no more than ‘a set of habitual practices and attitudes.’389  It is 
suggested herein that a number of the private/public factors articulated in 
Gulf/Piper remain relevant, and that in many instances modern technological 
advances in evidentiary matters have overtaken prescribed doctrine.  In many 
instances the divide between competing factors is no longer apt as they coalesce 
together.390 
A primary instance of new advances supplanting old perspectives relates to 
the prominence of witness protection as a cogent and genuine factor.  This refers 
to protecting witnesses from the inconvenience of travelling to a far away forum 
to give evidence.  It  will be relevant, as Fawcett has identified, to evaluate the 
‘disruption to caused by others by the absence of witnesses from their work 
place.’391  This factor received supererogatory effect in The Rothnie.392  The 
plaintiffs, an English company resident and carrying on business in England, were 
the  disponent  owners of the Rothnie vessel pursuant  to a bareboat charter.  The 
defendants were an English company carrying on business as a ship repairer in 
Gibraltar.  By a contract between the parties, the defendants agreed to carry out 
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certain repair and maintenance work to be vessel in dry-dock in Gibraltar, and the 
dispute centred on the  quality of this repair work.393    The court determined that  
the action had the most real and substantial connection with Gibraltar.  Of 
decisive significance was that the  work had been carried out in Gibraltar, and thus  
it would be highly disruptive to the workings of a  shipyard in Gibraltar to have to 
bring a number of  key personnel to give evidence in England.  The concern here 
is that the convenience of those who are professional interested in litigation 
should carry little weight in comparison with the convenience of those whose 
normal occupation in life would be  interrupted by attendance in court to give 
evidence.394  Similar principles underpinned the decision in MacShannon v 
Rockware Glass Ltd.,395 where all the witnesses were in Scotland, a vital factor in 
identifying Scotland rather than England as the appropriate forum.  Lord Diplock 
stated that: 
 
“the administration of justice within the United Kingdom should 
be conducted in such  a way as to avoid any unnecessary 
diversion to the purposes of litigation, of time and efforts of 
witnesses and other which would otherwise be spent on activities 
that are more directly productive of national wealth or well-
being.”396 
  
 The experience in the U.S. has been similar, and concentration has focused 
upon matters such as: the location of the witnesses and documents;397 the cost of 
translating documents and testimony;398 the cost of travel for key witnesses;399 the 
cost of  producing the evidence at trial;400 and the location of the physical 
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evidence.401  Minimal procedural devices need to be available in the alternative 
forum, but need not be as advantageous or sophisticated as that adopted within the 
purview of the U.S. civil justice system.  By way of illustration in Zermeno  v 
McDonald Douglas Corp.,402 amenability to  venue existed in the Mexican court 
system  despite the lack of a jury trial, problems submitting photographs and 
photocopies into evidence, and discovery limitations.  Procedural difficulties 
prevailing in Indonesian law in Carney v Singapore Airlines403 did not deprive 
their courts of the opportunity to stand tall and hear the case; and similar 
principles were replicated before the First Circuit in Mercier v Sheratan 
International,404 acknowledging that Turkish courts have their own procedures for 
compelling discovery and should not be castigated as ‘inadequate’ merely because 
it is less generous to litigants than under the American framework.405 
 The practical reality, of course, is that these factors have reduced 
importance, and become obsolete in some respects, because technological 
innovations and ease of travel have diminished the practical impact and judicial 
significance of these considerations.406  Interestingly, a minority of  federal courts 
have asserted that private interest factors weigh against forum non conveniens 
dismissals when the product has been designed, tested or manufactured in the 
U.S.; the focal gravity of the cause of action is determinative of venue 
resolution.407  These courts have downplayed the fact that witnesses and medical 
records regarding the specific cause and extent of the claimant’s injuries may be  
located abroad.408  The courts have simply pointed out that a defendant’s inability 
to compel foreign  witnesses to testify in a trial in the U.S. can be ameliorated by 
procuring testimony in disposition or documentary form.409  Whatever the merits 
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of venue resolution, the contextualised approach in these authorities is flagrantly 
contradictory to the federal standard enunciated in Gulf Oil/Piper Aircraft.  As 
Born has cogently identified, modernity  developments have reduced the impact of  
private interest factors connected to, “relatively minor logistical issues, which can 
be  overcome by modern communications”,410 and deleteriously supercede, “the 
vastly more important effects that foreign non conveniens dismissals have on the 
substantive outcome of litigation”,411 their overarching utility should be 
challenged. 
 At a functional level, a dismissal in adoption of the federal standard has an 
outcome determinative effect on the litigation as it is highly unrealistic to assume 
that the disaffected plaintiff can bring the  action in the supposedly more suitable 
foreign court.412  Invocation of the Piper test takes on a subliminal resonance that 
will, “eliminate the likelihood that 0.the case will be tried…discussion of 
convenience and witnesses takes on a Kafkaesque quality – everyone knows that 
no witnesses ever will be called to testify.”413   In this regard, iteration of docket 
congestion as a relevant public interest factory represents a stalking horse 
argument, akin to international comity and anti-chauvinism, as considered earlier.  
The  docket clearing process, entirely wrongly, operated as an enlivening force 
towards the adoption of a more liberal forum non conveniens dismissal 
techniques.414  A cathartic panacea, in the limited eyes of some, to expediously 
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promote adventitious trials for  U.S. residents and citizens was to exclude foreign 
plaintiffs seeking a U.S. hearing; recourse was sought to solve the dilemmatic 
choices presented via this device rather  than appropriate reformation of  
inadequate in personam jurisdiction principles.415  A capricious schism emerged 
as the Supreme Court accepted docket congestion as a relevant consideration for 
forum non conveniens dismissals, but disregarded it in other ambits.  This divide 
is extremely  unfortunate as convenience of the court (not the litigants) and 
judge’s unwillingness to hear genuine disputes are illegitimate factorisations 
outwith forum non conveniens appraisals.416  The disappointing result in  the U.S., 
and still of significance, is that  administrative hyperbole has skewed legal 
principles on choice of venue, with consequential inequality  between litigants.  
The presumptive favouritism vis-à-vis an American claimant suing a  foreign 
defendant, in contradistinction to an alien plaintiff seeking redress from a home 
defendant, is egregious.  The burden ought to be reversed to challenge U.S. 
plaintiffs with the hurdle of providing a rationale of why the action cannot be 
determined in the jurisdiction of the foreign defendant, thereby facilitating better 
utilisation of court resources and time: 
 
“The American courts’ overt reliance on calendar congestion as 
a standard reason for dismissing cases tips the scales far too 
heavily against retaining jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the 
statement of such a justification for closing the nation’s courts 
(against foreign plaintiffs) is extremely demoralising  to the 
disappointed litigants and comes into obvious  conflict with the 
system’s need for ‘justice …. to be seen to be done’ .”417 
 
 The discretionary forum non conveniens doctrine, it should be recalled, 
demands a preliminary hearing to resolve the venue dispute; representatively it 
constitutes a trial within a trial as the parties are litigating to decide where to 
litigate.418  The hearing is preliminary only in the sense of initial as all relevant 
factors locating the action need to be explored, and these myriad of ethereal and 
hybrid considerations incorporate the substantive merits of the dispute.  In light of 
the outcome determinative nature of the inquiry the respective litigants will be 
advised to expend vast amounts of time, money and resources in obtaining  
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extensive discovery documents to aid their arguments.  The perceived benefits of 
clearing docket congestion through liberal forum non conveniens dismissals is 
seriously emasculated through expenditure and resource implications.  Entirely 
contrary to arguments advanced by proponents of the current federal standard, 
potential administrative benefits may be rendered nugatory as, “dockets will not 
be cleared, but instead will be  cluttered with motions to determine applicability of 
forum non conveniens.”419 
 The English landscape on docket congestion is markedly different than the 
U.S.  A distinctive hue and shading affects the palette of  relevant factors in that 
the legal system does not enjoy the same attractive features to the claimant in a 
transnational dispute, the global nature of  civil and commercial business attracted 
tends to be  of a high quality, and is valuable from an economic stand point:420 
 
London is a centre for international foreign 
businessmen who have confidence in English courts 
and it is a service to  international trade to assist in the 
settlement of  international commercial 
disputes….There are  undoubted invisible export 
benefits to the nation when foreigners come to England 
to litigate and it is also to be hoped that persons who 
bring litigation to the country will also bring trade.”421 
 
 It is disappointing that the administrative concern of docket congestion has 
mistakenly obfuscated the  forum non conveniens balancing equation in the U.S. 
As Born and Rutledge422  have clearly asserted: “complaints of docket congestion 
quickly become self-fulfilling prophecies – once one judge states that a court’s 
docket is overcrowded, subsequent judges can seize upon that language in future 
cases to support dismissal.”423  The impact has been deleteriously inured by alien 
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plaintiffs excluded from U.S. courts, and has precluded effective distillation of in 
personam jurisdiction principles.424  The focus has been on the wrong public 
interest factor, and attention as iterated at length above should reflect a wider 
applicable  law inquiry as part of an intellectually coherent discipline.  The Anglo-
American adoption of a broad most appropriate forum standardisation has left the 
trial judge as empress of this realm, and with ubiquitous power to balance 
exogenetic factors to determine whether a more suitable forum exists abroad.425  
The rôle of empress is aligned with virtually unreviewable judicial discretion, and 
the trial judge is insulated from effective appellate review which only arises where 
there has been a clear abuse of discretion.  The decision can be immunised from 
review by  broadly reciting the litany of factors established in  Piper, and this 
amorphous discretion makes predictive outcome extremely problematic given the 
intuitive and subjective processes engaged.426 This is  self-evident by reference to 
the variety of categorisations that have proved singularly determinative across a 
wide field of juridical precepts: language of documentation; consolidation of 
related actions; evaluation of substantive merits of the dispute; and enforceability 
of judgments.427  The ‘crazy quilt’428 of exogenetic influences and considerations 
to the balancing equation in forum non conveniens continues unabated. 
D. Minimum Standards of Justice 
 It is absolutely vital that the exercise of a court’s adjudicatory discretion 
should not constitute a denial of justice.  The ‘ends of justice’ analysis may occur 
at different ends of the spectrum under Anglo-American law, but ultimately the 
same issue arises as to genuine amenability of the alternative foreign  forum in 
terms of minimum standardisations of effective redress.429  In the U.S. 
consideration of the availability of an adequate remedy is beset with dilemmatic 
choices that relate to the very epicentre of the forum non conveniens doctrine.  The 
federal test establishes that if, ‘the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly 
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unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate alternative’.430  This 
sweeping generalisation, lacking in specificity or  particularity, was tempered by 
the Supreme Court admonishment that a finding of inadequacy occurs only in 
‘rare circumstances’, extrapolated as circumstances where the alternative forum, 
‘does not permit litigation on the subject-matter of the dispute.’431  A famous 
exposition of such distinct factorisation occurred in Perkins v Benguet 
Consolidated Mining Co.,432 where the availability of effective redress in Ohio 
impacted on venue resolution set against no recovery elsewhere.  It was 
impossible for the defendant, a Philippine corporation, to be sued at  home at the 
time of the suit in light of the  ongoing war between Japan and the U.S., with  the 
latter occupying the Philippines.  A claim anywhere but in Ohio, which allowed 
the  litigation to proceed, was in essence a brutum fulmen. 
 A number of factors have been embraced by U.S. court in determining the 
‘amenability’ question for respective parties.433  A litigant may be excluded from 
access to alien courts because of coercive political pressure in that jurisdiction, but 
as stated, the ‘amenability’ concern has generally been inadequately appraised.434  
A potpourri of concerns have been adduced, but  failed to meet the lack of 
amenability  threshold: distinct procedures;435 lack of access to  a jury in the 
alternative forum; extensive delays in litigation abroad;436 and vastly reduced 
compensation levels.437  The search has rudimentarily  addressed the ‘putative’ 
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availability of the foreign legal system in a liberal  capability sense, rather than 
adventitious procedural or adjectival  benefits to the individual, and as such most 
foreign venues have satisfied the test despite no effective means of redress.  The 
imposition of a financial burden on the disaffected claimant has been generally 
ineffective to alter venue as an irreducible minimum ‘standards of justice’ test.438  
 The ‘amenability’ test has been subjected to a detailed and comprehensive 
recent examination by Samuels, reviewing every published federal  court decision 
(nearly 1500 decisions in all) over  the course of the last three decades.439  This 
critique supports the limited court review that occurs under the first – prong of 
Piper regarding the  adequacy template.  It is rare cases that meet this threshold in 
terms of minimum standards of justice.  The rare illustrations  presented, as 
unique as ostrich eggs, reflected genuine abuses or no opportunity at all of any 
redress: political or social persecution; systemic  corruption or bias in the foreign 
legal system; denial of entry for the claimant; and lack of a stable forum.440  By 
way of illustration in Licea,441 the plaintiff faced political and social prosecution if 
forced to return to Cuba to litigate the case; in Presbyterian Church of Sudan,442 
the non-Muslim plaintiffs had no opportunity of a fair trial or means of effective 
redress in Sudan at the relevant time; in Cabiri,443 a threat of  torture and 
persecution applied to the party if  the claim was pursued in Ghana; in 
Martinez,444 flagrant corruption in the Honduran judiciary system prevented a fair 
trial therein; and in I.T. Consultants445 the political instability in Pakistan 
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prevented a legitimate consideration of the claim.  Only in the most extreme and 
palpable cases have substantial justice incantations prevailed in the U.S.446 
 The experience in England has proved rather  different, and denial of 
effective redress on the predicate of substantial justice has  been determined, as 
Fentiman asserts, where no equivalent remedy lies in the alternative forum, where 
bias exists, statutory and other bars mean the claim presumptively fails, and for 
reasons of  undue prejudice.447  The substantial justice inquiry occurs at a later 
stage than the  federal standard.448  Lord Goff clearly established that the initial 
burden rests upon a defendant to convince the court that a stay ought to  be 
granted because there is another available forum which is ‘clearly more 
appropriate’ than England.449  If that threshold is met the burden shifts to the 
plaintiff in accordance with the second prong of the test to adduce that a  
minimum standard of justice cannot be obtained in the foreign forum.450  A clear 
dichotomy thus applies between the Piper test and Spiliada, but the practical 
reality has been that each test has been coalesced together, or on occasions 
subverted as in Mohammed v Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East K.S.C.,451 
wherein a standard of justice requirement was imported into the more appropriate 
forum balancing equation. 
 The issue in Mohammed presented a classical illustration of inadequacy of 
redress abroad.  The plaintiff, an Iraqi citizen, sought redress for payments due 
from his  Kuwaiti employer under his service contract.  Evidence was presented 
that for disparate reasons he was unable to return to Kuwait subsequent to the  
invasion there by allied forces.  It was affirmed by Lord Justice Evans, presenting 
the  leading judgment in the Court of Appeal, that  ‘substantial justice’ was a vital 
and relevant factor to the test of ‘appropriate and available forum’, thus importing 
it into the first limb of Spiliada.452  It was regarded by the appellate court as quite 
inimical to the stay discretion to disregard questions of practical or substantial 
justice.  The plaintiff, denied access to Kuwait, to any representation there, or 
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execute legal documents in that venue, clearly demonstrated that he was denied 
‘substantial justice’ in the  foreign forum and met the standardised test established 
in Spiliada.453 
 The judicial precepts of bias and ineffective foreign legal systems have 
prevailed as part of the substantial justice iteration.  In Oppenheimer v Louis 
Rosenthal and Co. A.G.,454 for reasons of inherent prejudice abroad, an English 
court was identified as forum conveniens  for resolution of an action between a 
German citizen  working in England and a German company, his employers.  The 
plaintiff was excluded from access to the alien venue and clearly would have been 
unable to obtain legal representation.  A minimum standard of justice must be 
available within the foreign legal  system, although English courts are generally 
reluctant to embark on a detailed comparative  examination of the alternative 
framework or processes.  This rationale formed the predicate for rejecting Saudi 
Arabian jurisdiction  in Islamic Arab Insurance Co v Saudi Egyptian American 
Reinsurance Co.,455 where the Saudi Arabian courts lacked expertise in insurance 
law disputes and where no specialist courts or legal representation was available.  
On occasion, as in Dornoch Ltd,456 the English court have rejected a stay through 
acceptance of the argument that the matter would inevitably and unduly fail 
abroad in the  foreign venue: remedies and defences were not available in the 
tortious aspect of the  claim in Mauritius. 
 In truth, however, the exogenetic factors that are considered in  Anglo-
American law as part of the balanced equation remain vague and amorphous.  
Developments have occurred in an ad-hoc fashion by judicial creativity.  The 
likelihood of predicting the determinative factor in the overall  template, certainly 
in relation to the English Spiliada standard, is subject to ‘hyperfine factual 
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distinctions’ that remain unduly impressionistic and vague.457  The adjudicative 
and interpretative proves is not unmediated and content-neutral, but is inherently 
policy-orientated.  The amorphous nature of the federal standard and Spiliada 
principles demands reform, and arguably the  certainty imbued with limited 
flexibility adopted by the High Court of Australia in Voth v Manilora Flour Mills 
Pty, Ltd. represents the best way forward for the doctrine.  It is to extant law 
therein that the focus now shifts. 
 
 
VI LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIA: THE WAY AHEAD FOR FORUM  
 NON CONVENIENS 
An alternative perspective and solution applies to resolution of  the forum 
non conveniens debate.  The Australian  High Court has chosen to adopt the 
classical  theory of the doctrine, demanding  evidence that suit is brought in an 
oppressive, vexatious or abusive process, that the forum will be clearly 
inappropriate rather than the  modern Anglo-American template.  This arguably  
presents an encomium panacea in the adoption of  a more limited rôle for forum 
non conveniens, aligned with properly structured personal  jurisdiction principles.  
A residual place should exist for discretionary flexibility, as a fail-safe device, 
where proceedings are egregiously brought against a home defendant simply to 
vex and harass them – actions where it is unduly inconvenient to allow them to 
proceed in  the seised forum.  A return to the old abuse of process standard-bearer 
would allow the inquiry to more closely mirror the  original intent and social 
conscience of the  doctrine, best serving the convenience of the parties and the 
ends of justice: 
 
“[A] specially narrow area of discretion can be  circumscribed to 
protect foreign defendants in cases of great hardship.  There 
should be dismissal only when flagrant injustice would be done 
by  allowing the suit to proceed.  This would mean cases in 
which all factors of convenience point to the defendant’s forum 
and the [plaintiff’s] only possible purpose in bring suit here was 
to harass the defendant into an unfavourable settlement.”458 
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 The adoption of a clearly inappropriate forum standardisation would 
preclude multinational corporations from Macchiavellian game-playing vis-à-vis 
litigational venue resolution tactics.  It supercedes the assertion that it  would be 
‘inconvenient’ for them to hold a trial  in the home forum, even when the 
corporation’s world headquarters is located in the state where suit is brought and 
within three blocks of the  courthouse.459  Trial courts, when determining  
dismissals (or stays) of proceedings, should consider the specific circumstances 
and burdens faced by personal injury victims of multinational  abuses in 
developing countries, give substantial  weight to the inadequate remedies in these 
countries, and prescribe forum non conveniens dismissals in abuse of process 
cases as  subsequently modified by the Australian model.  The venerable origins 
of the process would be retained, promoting certainty tinged with  limited 
flexibility to deal with hard cases.460 
 One year after the House of Lords decision  in Spiliada, the High Court of 
Australia followed an entirely different pathway in Oceanic Sun Line Special 
Shipping Co. Inc. v Fay,461 rejecting  the most suitable forum test.  Vituperative 
academic criticism has been engendered against the  abuse of process standard in 
Australia, but it has been retained and applied over the last two  decades.462  The 
antediluvian reformulation of an  ‘oppressive and vexatious’ template derived 
from St Pierre has held sway, dictated by ‘policy, precedent and legal 
principle.’463  Access to Australian legal system should not lightly be refused:  “It  
is a basic tenet of our jurisprudence that, where jurisdiction exists, access to our 
courts is a right.”464  Oppressive, according to Justice Deane, should in this 
context, be understood as meaning, ‘seriously and unfairly burdensome, 
prejudicial  or damaging’; vexatious should be understood as meaning ‘productive 
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of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment.’465  The prevailing general 
approach was stated in the following terms: 
 
“A party who has regularly invoked the jurisdiction of a 
competent court has a prima facie right to  insist upon its 
exercise and to have his claim heard and determined….In this 
country, [certain] special  categories of cases have not 
traditionally encompassed a general judicial discretion to 
dismiss or stay  proceedings in a case within jurisdiction 
merely on the ground that the local court is persuaded that 
some tribunal in another country would be a  more appropriate 
forum.”466 
 
 The Australian approach to forum non conveniens was further developed 
by the High Court decision in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd.,467 and  more 
definitive rules were forthcoming.  In Voth, the Court had the opportunity to 
consider the liability of professional accountants for negligent misrepresentation 
in an international context.  The plaintiffs, although not themselves carrying out 
business in the United States, were part of a group structure which operated there.  
The defendant provided accounting, auditing and related services to MMC (the 
group’s operating company) in Missouri.  The plaintiffs contended that the 
defendant owed a duty of  care with respect to the services rendered to MMC.  It 
was alleged that his conduct in failing to draw the attention of MMC and the other 
companies in the group to withholding tax under the U.S. Internal  Revenue 
Code468 fell below the professional standards appropriate to that duty of care, 
resulting in  damage to the plaintiffs under Australian revenue law.  The plaintiff 
obtained leave to serve based upon damage suffered within New South Wales.  
The High Court declared that, within Australia, a stay of proceedings should be 
granted only  when the forum chosen by the plaintiff was  clearly inappropriate.  
The power to stay should  be exercised only in a clear case where the  continuation 
would be vexatious and oppressive.  It would have to be shown that there was an 
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appropriate foreign tribunal which had jurisdiction and which would exercise it.469  
The majority of  the Court articulated the constrained template for adoption: 
 
“First, a plaintiff who has regularly invoked the  jurisdiction of 
a court has a prima facie right to insist upon its exercise.  
Secondly, the traditional  power to stay proceedings which 
have been  regularly commenced, on inappropriate forum 
grounds, is to be exercised in accordance with  the general 
principle empowering a court to dismiss or stay proceedings 
which are oppressive, vexatious  or an abuse of process and the 
rationale for the exercise of the power to stay is the avoidance 
of injustice between the parties in the particular case.  Thirdly, 
the mere fact that the  balance of convenience favours another 
jurisdiction or that some other jurisdiction would provide a  
more appropriate forum does not justify the dismissal of the 
action or the grant of a  stay.  Finally, the jurisdiction to grant a 
stay or dismiss the action is to be exercised with great care or 
extreme caution”.470 
 
 The Australian High Court has reaffirmed their  adherence to the basic 
tenet that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is not lightly to be dismissed.  An 
individualistic test has been purveyed which is  out of kilter with Anglo-American 
common law, that is unique in the Commonwealth, but which minimises the need 
to evaluate the quality of justice promulgated in competing foreign legal  systems 
nor engage in a burdensome comparative law search.471  The delicate balance 
between litigants is respected, albeit legitimately skewed in favour of a plaintiff’s 
selection of appropriate venue.  If a plaintiff chooses a forum  purely for higher 
damages (the moth to the  U.S. flame) or more extensive discovery, but the 
selective forum had no focal epicentre to the litigation (i.e. the forum was clearly 
inappropriate), then under the Australian model the defendant can  obtain 
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dismissal even where the plaintiff did not behave in a vexatious or oppressive 
manner in bringing suit.  The traditional abuse of process test, entitling dismissal 
of an action only where the plaintiff is bringing suit in an oppressive or vexatious 
manner, is modified to incorporate dismissal on an unconscionability  basis; this 
arguably reflects the true conscience of the doctrine.472 
 The application of the ‘true conscience’ of forum non conveniens would 
have produced vastly different results in the controversial U.S. cases referred to 
earlier, and more adventitious outcomes advanced.  In Abdullahi, it was not an 
abuse of process for a large pharmaceutical  drugs company to be sued in their 
home forum for decisions taken by the U.S. parent company regarding  
experimental trials of a new antibiotic Trovan in Nigeria with consequential 
serious  harm; in Aguinda it was not clearly inappropriate for a U.S. based oil-
company to be sued in New York for organisational  decisions therein about 
corporate activities polluting the rain forests of Ecuador and Peru; and this was 
replicated in Flores and Turedi with their corporate manifestations and 
operational control in the  U.S.  In a similar vein if such a standard had been 
determinative in Bhopal, it would have  been more burdensome for Union Carbide 
to deny  jurisdiction in the New York court.  The  determinative case of Piper 
Aircraft, should beneficially be evaluated in this new light.  The nexus between 
the defendants’ activities in their  home forum of Pennsylvania and the claims 
brought there – the base of their manufacturing site and  state of incorporation – 
properly arrogated personal  jurisdiction.  In such a scenario the impacted state has 
an undoubted interest in regulating manufacturing within its borders.  It is 
submitted that a  concomitant of this is that it is their activities in the U.S. that 
defendants must justify, for activities in which corporations are intentionally 
engaged and to which they could reasonably have foreseen forum  law being 
determinative.473  The optimal rule-selection technique advanced by the Australian 
traditional  standard would effect an efficacious result demarcating the veritable 
essence of the doctrine.  The action in Pennsylvania was not  brought simply to 
vex or harass the defendants; in no sense was it ‘clearly inappropriate’ for a 
Pennsylvanian manufacturer to be sued in their  home state for conduct effected 
therein.  Health  and Safety Regulations for manufactured products should be 
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applicable to home residents regardless  of domestic or international sales 
destinations. 
 A corollary exists between the possible adopted  in Voth and the 
perspective advanced by the  Second Circuit Court in Carlenstolpe,474 reflective of 
good practice in promoting public interest concerns to the epicentre of venue 
resolution.  The outcome therein constitutes the very antithesis of unfortunate 
determinations in U.S. multinational abuse case such as Abdullahi, Aguinda and 
Flores amongst others, wherein  international comity and anti-chauvinism 
arguments were deleteriously employed.  The dispute in Carlenstolpe 
concentrated upon a claim  by a U.S. multinational pharmaceutical company to 
dismiss a Swedish plaintiff’s tortious claims  regarding a novel vaccine developed 
in the U.S., but marketed and distributed in Sweden.  The dismissal claim was 
rejected, quite correctly, a progenination of any harms accrued in the U.S. and 
public policy interests demanded recourse to a local courtroom for resolution.475  
The principles laid down by the Second Circuit echo the optimal pathway charted 
in Voth: 
 
“The question to be answered is whether plaintiffs chosen 
forum is itself inappropriate or unfair because  of the various 
private and public interest considerations involved.  That [the 
alternative forum] may have an interest in this lawsuit does not 
in any way  alter the fact that plaintiff’s chosen forum also has 
a significant interest in its outcome or that the crucial liability 
evidence in this case is more convenient to the present forum 
than to the proposed alternative forum.  Accordingly,  [the 
foreign country’s] acknowledged interest in  this lawsuit, even 
if it were stronger than the  present forum’s interest – which 
this court does not find it to be – would not necessarily form 
adequate grounds for forum non conveniens dismissal.”476 
 
 The abuse of process standard in Voth adopts the correct balance between 
certainty and flexibility in venue resolution.  It presents a bulwark to the 
discriminatory treatment accorded to alien plaintiffs identified in Piper Aircraft, 
the nature of which was cogently and evocatively criticised by the Washington 
Supreme Court in Myers v Boeing Co.,  a rare illustration of refusal in the U.S. to 
adopt the Supreme Court’s tautological reasoning:  
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“The Court’s logic does not withstand scrutiny.  The Court is 
comparing applies and oranges.  Foreigners, by definition, can 
never choose the United States as their home forum.  The Court 
purports to be giving lesser deference to the foreign plaintiffs’ 
choice of forum when, in reality, it is giving lesser deference to 
foreign plaintiffs, based solely on their status as foreigners.  
More importantly, it is not necessarily less reasonable to 
assume that a  plaintiff from British Columbia, who brings suit 
in Washington, has chosen a less convenient forum than a 
plaintiff from Florida bringing the same suit? To take it one 
step further, why it is less reasonable to assume that a plaintiff 
who is a Japanese citizen residing in Wentachee, who brings 
suit in  Washington, has chosen a less convenient forum than a 
plaintiff from Florida bringing the same suit?  The Court’s 
reference to the attractiveness of United States courts to 
foreigners, combined with a holding that, in application, gives 
loss deference to foreign plaintiffs based on their status as 
foreigners, raises concerns about xenophobia.  This alone 
should put us on guard.” 
 
 
VII CONCLUSION 
 Forum Non Conveniens has a vital rôle to play as a ‘species’ of alternative 
dispute resolution.  It forms a significant ingredient within international 
commercial litigation, and may operate to temper exorbitant jurisdictional  
principles prevalent in Anglo-American law.   It legitimately promotes natural 
justice with the engrained putative search for  a true seat and natural forum for 
venue resolution.  This  discretionary and equitable device can operate to promote 
efficiency and settlement of disputes.  As  stated herein, a nuanced and selective 
operation of the doctrine needs to be retained.  The sophistication provided ought 
not to be lost to ‘supranationalism’, but the template can beneficially be combined 
with applicable choice of law public interest factors to promote further intellectual 
coherence in this substantive arena. 
 It is an apposite time for a fresh reappraisal of appropriate levels of 
connectivity between adjudicatory jurisdiction and applicable choice of law 
principles.  This article has suggested a need for enhanced consideration of public 
interest and progenitor of harm precepts in shifting the equipoise in balancing 
relevant factors towards venue resolution.  The recent momentum shift towards 
                                                                                                                                                               
476
  Ibid., at 1281 
  96
further harmonisation of choice of law standardisations in contract and tort, 
provided by the promulgation of the Rome I and II Regulations, provides a 
backdrop for beneficial coalescence of reciprocal branches of private international 
law.  In this transmogrification, however, it is vital that forum non conveniens 
continues to operate, and to reflect the venerable antiquity and sophistication of 
the doctrine’s origins. 
 
 
 
 
